Is it easier to be a Turk in Berlin or a Pakistani in Bradford?

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1 A difficult journey

In 1933 J.B. Priestley embarked on an ‘English Journey’ and, as he criss-crossed the country, found himself naturally drawn to his home town of Bradford. It was, he said, ‘one of the most provincial and yet one of the most cosmopolitan of English provincial cities.’ The international dimension came partly from the wool trade but also from an influx of German and German-Jewish immigrants during the early and mid-Victorian periods. The houses they once inhabited are now, in part, owned by the British-Pakistani middle class. The parallels between then and now are not perfect, but the lesson drawn by Priestley so many years ago still holds good: ‘History shows us that the countries that have opened their doors have gained just as the countries that have driven out large numbers of their citizens for racial, religious or political reasons, have always paid dearly for their lack of tolerance.’

That could serve as the motto for our study: Kreuzberg, like Bradford, has gained a new identity as the result of immigrant settlement. With 53,000 Turks (i.e. people of Turkish origin) living in this district which has a total population of 148,000, Kreuzberg is the biggest Turkish city district outside Asia Minor.

Berlin, like Bradford, was a magnet for foreigners. The Berlin telephone book lists names from Abaci to Zülfükar testifying to the need for foreign muscle and brainpower as the city grew. Between 1900 and 1914, the population of Berlin doubled from 2 million to 4 million – nearly 400 new inhabitants every day, most of them of foreign origin; Kreuzberg, in particular, was always attractive to immigrants.

Kreuzberg – named after the city’s biggest elevation, the 66-metre ‘Cross Hill’ where Teutonic Knights and Templars maintained their vineyards during the Middle Ages – became a city district in 1920. Until the mid-1930s, Kreuzberg was the most highly populated district of Berlin. After 1946, only 60% of the 120,000 houses remained inhabitable.

Today, Kreuzberg (after merging with Berlin’s smallest district, Friedrichshain) is the most densely populated district (14,282 inhabitants per square kilometre). It has the highest unemployment rate in the city (27%), a high proportion of welfare recipients (23%) and ranks lowest in terms of green spaces (5 square metres per inhabitant).

Neither Bradford nor Berlin can count as great success stories in today’s globalised business culture. Berlin, despite being the capital of Europe’s largest economy, is close to bankruptcy and bereft of significant industries. It is struggling to merge the eastern and western sections, and the decades of federal subsidies to West Berlin have made the city slower to react to global changes than Hamburg, Stuttgart or Munich. Bradford continues to suffer from the problem pinpointed by Priestley: the proximity of prosperous Leeds and the natural trend of the young and ambitious to seek their fortunes outside Bradford. Priestley’s 1933 observation still holds good: ‘A city that has mixed trades will probably have some of its corners rubbed off; it must work with other places; but Bradford, with its one trade, was all corners, hard provincial angles.’
In uncertain times for both cities, the immigrant community can be seen either as a burden – on welfare payments or educational resources – or as a hidden strength. No single person, no single authority can clearly determine whether Berlin and Bradford remain essentially open cities or whether, accompanied by broader European fears about Islam and immigration, they are beginning to close the gates and pull down the shutters. The character of a city arises out of a complicated dynamic, the push and shove of urban society. That is what we wanted to look at through the prism of the deceptively simple question: ‘Is it easier to be a Turk in Berlin, or a Pakistani in Bradford?’ There is no sensible way of measuring happiness and so – unlike the excellent AGF studies on immigration published earlier – we steer clear of academic methodology. Nor did we want to become prisoners of political labels like multiculturalism, parallel societies or cohesive citizenship that seem to cloud an absence of policy rather than accurately describe the situation on the ground. Berlin and Bradford have both been ‘multicultural’ for the best part of two centuries; they were open to foreign cultures and grew with them. It was never a uniform process. Bradford took in immigrants in large numbers from 1830; it had its own Schillerverein (Schiller Association) and various German cultural associations and, while its merchants were often German, its workers were likely to be drawn from the Polish and Russian ghettos. However the first world war saw many German-Jewish émigrés anglicise their names as an anti-German climate crept up on West Yorkshire. In the 1930s the local press complained about the arrival of German Jews fleeing from the Nazis. After 1945, as the new immigration came from South Asia, there was a similar dichotomy. Pakistanis were welcome workers in a region short of manpower, providing they strove to be British: ‘We were supposed to fit in, so we did,’ remembers Abdur Rahman Saheb, a former mill worker, ‘but we couldn’t please the Yorkshiremen. They wanted us to be British – but not too British. They wanted us inside and outside.’ The relationship has evolved, but not always for the better as became plain during the Bradford riots. The open-ness of a city, its readiness to absorb or live side-by-side with a new culture, is never a given: it is the subject of constant re-negotiation.

Berlin and its Turks present similar, though not always identical dilemmas. Both cities reflect the wider problems of their national societies. The cities, and the countries, have at least two features in common: neither the British nor the Germans can fully recognize the positive impact on economic growth of migrant communities. Immigration remains an acutely sensitive political issue. Few politicians are prepared to champion a cause perceived as a drastic vote-loser. Germany, in particular, still insists that it is not an ‘Einwanderungsland’ (immigration country). The immediate reason is clear: unemployment at 4.3 million, including jobless rates of well over 20% in many East German communities, has made the union movement resistant to any inflow of ‘cheap’ labour that could undermine its bargaining power. The tentative connection between the political left and the Turkish community is therefore under strain. Chancellor Schröder wooed the Turkish constituency before the 2002 election – 500,000 Turkish Germans, many of them active voters – but the move was controversial among his advisers: the risk of losing traditional Social Democratic voters was regarded as unacceptably high. In local council elections in eastern Berlin, the ‘foreigner problem’ remains part of the political rhetoric of almost all parties, right and left (the exceptions are the Greens and the ex-communist Party of the Democratic Socialists). Politicians in (western) districts with high ethnic concentration – above all Kreuzberg and Wedding – are obliged to temper their speeches and make a defence of multiculturalism. A new administrative reorganization of Berlin wards, joining Kreuzberg with (eastern) Friedrichshain and Wedding with (western) Tiergarten and (eastern) Mitte, will soon generate some interesting changes in the way that political representatives address and speak for their constituents. But the fact remains nothing mobilises the
electorate in Berlin more than immigration; sometimes the sheer volatility of the issue encourages politicians to swaddle it in silence. The same applies to Bradford politics.

Yet the immigrant community is the only sure guarantee of the population growth needed to finance the future in Britain and Germany. There are skills shortages in both countries. And the United Nations Populations Division calculates that to compensate for a declining birth rate – and cope with the pension crisis spawned by longer life expectancy – Britain will immediately need annual immigration of around 1 million while Germany will need (in the year 2050) 3.4 million new inhabitants every year.

The figure is the most dramatic of several options but it illustrates a simple fact: if European nations want to maintain social benefits at the present levels, they have to accept that immigration is a positive force. Alternatives – scaling back pensions and state benefits, or state incentives to boost the birth rate – barely scratch the surface of the huge demographic problem. A ban on immigration to Germany would reduce the population from 82 million to 59 million by 2050, and the number of those in working age would drop by 41%. Germany, in other words, needs its Turks as much as, if not more than, in the 1960s. A purely instrumental approach to the Turkish community however is no longer enough. The *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) generation is growing older; half a million are already over 60 and increasingly they are spending their old age in Germany. We were struck, visiting one old people’s home in Berlin, how many residents were Turks – and how many of the male nurses were Turkish Germans serving out their time as conscientious objectors. By the year 2010 there will be 1.3 million pensioners of foreign origin in Germany; by 2030, there will be 2.8 million. That makes Turks both part of the ‘solution’ and part of the ‘problem’. There is no stronger case, it seems to us, for integrating ethnic communities into the public discussion.

Britain is not under quite the same demographic pressure as Germany and its unemployment rates are lower. But the obstacles to integration of South Asians were highlighted by the Bradford, Oldham and Burnley riots. Britain, like Germany, has to find an appropriate political vocabulary to deal with large and increasingly self-confident minority communities. The citizenship rights accorded to South Asians seem on the face of it to put Pakistanis in Bradford at an advantage over the Turks in Berlin. Yet the apparent advantages in the legal and political situation of Pakistanis do not always translate into improved life-chances. Ten years ago it was a safe assumption that the British Pakistani was better placed than the Berlin Turk. Now, the comparison is not so clear-cut. Why do Bradford Pakistanis – seemingly so privileged – take to the streets, while Kreuzberg Turks do not?

We have tried to trace some pattern of social mobility in the ethnic communities (as reporters we have a natural bias towards personal biographies) to see how and why opportunities are used or ignored, and to highlight some of the current obstacles to integration. The essential question seemed to us: How much state? How much individual? The balance between what the state can do to further integration, and the individual’s readiness to shape his or her own future in the host country is plainly different in Britain and in Germany. Yet there are parallels: ‘You have to learn not German, but the language of bureaucratic thought,’ says Vural Öger, a German Turk who has created his own travel group, ‘That is the first step to success.’ Omar Khan, owner of Bradford’s most famous curry house, agrees: ‘Both sides have to adapt to each other, the individual and the state. But ultimately the state has to remove the barriers, let us find our own way within, and not against, British society.’ Can Bradford learn from Berlin, Berlin from Bradford?
2 A tale of two cities – Manningham and Kreuzberg

Why Manningham?

‘The business was organised. Like accountants studying tax laws, the manpower-export experts of Pakistan studied the world’s immigration laws and competitively gambled with their emigrant battalions: visitors’ visas overstayable here (most European countries), dependants shippable there (England), students’ visas convertible there (Canada and the United States), political asylum to be asked for there (Austria and West Berlin), still no visas needed here, just below the Arctic Circle (Finland).’

V.S. Naipaul in Among the believers

The back room of the Belle Vue photographic studio on Manningham Lane resembled a props department at a provincial theatre. Stacks of old jackets, shiny ties, plastic flowers, combs, pens and radios contributed to the studio’s equipment. In the 1960s, this studio was one of the first addresses for young immigrant workers from India and Pakistan. Their first earnings often went on a Burton’s suit and impressive accessories – mostly supplied by the photographer – were displayed like medals on photographs which they sent back to their families in Asia. Archived photographs show serious and smiling young men, neatly combed and proudly holding gold watches or other symbols of affluence. The pictures were to show their families that Britain was exactly as it had been in their imagination.

It was not difficult for a young Asian worker to find a job in Britain during the post-war booming years. The British economy was seriously short of workforce and welcomed the support from the former colonies. The immigrant workers were granted residence. The Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1948 made all members of the former British colonies British citizens. With its flourishing textile industry, Bradford became one of the main destinations for South Asian migrants.

The Pakistani migration to Britain was largely the by-product of forced displacement on the Indian sub-continent. The partition of British India in 1947 – which created Pakistan – saw a huge exchange of population between India and Pakistan. It was these uprooted communities that were most ready to travel to Britain. A similar effect occurred in the late 1950s during the building of the Mangla Dam. Over 100,000 villagers were forced to move: some received land in the Punjab, others settled in Pakistan, but many used the cash compensation to finance migration to Britain. Typically, around 30% of the young males from a displaced village would make the journey to Bradford. Not all would travel on the same boat and other networks were begun on board. The needs of Bradford were very clear: a large number of men had fallen in the war and women, for various reasons, were reluctant or unable to take up the slack. The first post-war influx of Pakistanis became wool combers – a dirty, painstaking job, hard on the eyes, the hands and the back. White Bradford women continued to do the job by day – though with little
enthusiasm since the pay was bad – but were forbidden under new, post-war legislation
to work at night. The nightshift became a Pakistani preserve with the initial effect of
making them invisible: they slept during the day and headed for the mills after dark. As
job opportunities expanded, Pakistanis took on other daytime mill jobs. Houses in
Manningham (and Little Horton) began to fill up with Pakistanis. Ten Pakistanis would
sleep in a four-bedroom house and go out to work. Another ten would return from the
night shift and use the same beds.

Slowly the first anti-Pakistani stereotypes took shape – that they were living like rats, that
they were unhygienic, an alien presence: ‘Local girls were forbidden by their families to
go out with the Pakistani men and if romances started on the factory floor there was a
real sense of outrage among the white Bradfordians,’ recalls Dulcie, now an 82-year-old
resident of an old people’s home. In truth few Bradford girls were interested: the
Pakistanis, most from poor farming communities, had little English and little cash. The
rhythm of their lives was set by work, sleep, cooking at home – most found Yorkshire food
indigestible – and the three cinemas in town that showed Urdu films. ‘I can only
remember one romance,’ a 76-year-old retired plumber tells us, ‘That was a Pakistani bus
conductor, a good-looking boy – his girlfriend got into real trouble.’ The Pakistanis with
the best English – that is, with a good level of general education, were mainly absorbed
by the Bradford bus company.

By the early 1960s, the Bradford economy was beginning to run out of steam. If ever there
were a town in Britain to feel the decline of Britain, it was Bradford. The wool trade was
being undercut worldwide.

‘Since 1800 Bradford has been synonymous with wool textiles. In 1800 there was just one
solitary spinning mill, by 1850 there were 129 mills and by the end of the century 338 mills. In
1961, when the local textile industry had contracted, 34% of the labour force was still working
in textiles.’

*(Destination Bradford, Bradford Heritage Recording Unit. A Century of Immigration. 1987)*

At the same time, the empire had crumbled and (since Suez in 1956) Britain had lost its
ambition to be a global power. For Bradford, and Manningham in particular, this
translated into a shifting role for the Pakistani inhabitants. First, some Pakistanis laid off
from the mills started businesses of their own, catering above all for the specific needs of
their community: restaurants, shops with imported food, tailors, import-export
businesses. Second, women and daughters started to arrive. The surge in the early 1960s
was supposed to stay a step ahead of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 which
ended the automatic right to entry and brought in a system of work vouchers. Between
1960 and 1971 – when the Immigration Act further restricted entry – Pakistani women
fled into Manningham. In Bradford in 1971 there were 12,250 Pakistanis, 3,160 of whom
were women.

‘My father tried to teach us some English on the way. I hadn’t come across English before
so he taught us a few words on the train,’ says Riffat Akram. The teacher came to
Bradford in 1964 at the age of 11. As in other immigrant communities the children
became the interpreters, the true instrument of integration. The children not only had
the benefit of schooling, they were free of the crushing work rhythms that minimised
contact with white Bradfordians. They had time to look around and adjust their somewhat distorted image of Britain to the reality.

‘I thought it would be something from an Enid Blyton book; lots of nice plump children, big detached houses with massive lawns. I’d heard that the bread was very nice and there was something called jam. I thought it would be very pleasant but very wet and rainy too. That was as a child growing up in Pakistan,’ says Nadira Mirza who today works at Bradford University.

The arrival of women and the establishment of a family life converted the Pakistani ‘guest workers’ into permanent features of Bradford; they had settled. The Manningham houses were attractive in the first wave because they were cheap but also because it was possible to sub-divide rooms and cram the maximum number of bachelor workers into the most economic space. ‘Terrace houses in the Manningham area and around the university district offered ideal conditions,’ explains George Sheeran, Head of the Pennine and Yorkshire Studies Unit at Bradford University. The women changed the way that Pakistanis looked at their homes. They demanded more privacy, more elaborate cooking space. The rooms were prettified, curtains sewn. One room was set aside for worship – the young male Muslims in the first wave had become rather casual in their religious observance. Now, perhaps to make themselves acceptable husbands for Muslim daughters, they became more devout. By 1981, 32,100 people in Bradford registered as Pakistanis or Bangladeshis; by 1991 the number was almost 49,000 – one in nine of the population of the city.

The face of Manningham changed; Asians started to use strong colours to paint the faces of their houses, as if to say ‘We have arrived’. But the fresh paint marked an important trend in the town: the Pakistani community was splitting into those who were beginning to take gradual steps towards a settled middle-class existence and those who were not likely to recover from the contraction of the wool industry. In 1971, the nationwide unemployment rate for Asians was about 6% compared with 5.4% for the general population. By 1991, the Pakistani male unemployment rate was 28.5% compared to a white male rate of 10%. This is a slightly distorted comparison – the 1971 figure includes Indians with a far better employment record. However, it shows the nationwide trend which, in Bradford, was magnified. The overall Pakistani jobless figures were also swallowed by Muslim wives discouraged from working by their husbands yet registered at the labour exchange.

The abuse of women became a largely unspoken, submerged feature of Manningham life. The case of Zoora Shah illustrates some of the tensions that have arisen as Bradford’s immigrant community both adapts to and resists change. Zoora came from a village near Mirpur in Pakistan in the 1970s; she had been given away in an arranged marriage to a Bradford mill worker. She was beaten by the husband and abandoned by him when she
was pregnant with her third child. When Zoora left her husband she was disowned by her 
brothers. A Manningham drug dealer, Mohammed Azam, offered himself as a protector, 
arranging a mortgage for her. He too beat her and offered her as a prostitute. When he 
going on to make sexual advances to her daughters, she poisoned him with arsenic. In the 
murder trial she was ashamed to reveal details of her beatings or about her sexual 
relationship; she was jailed for 20 years. The Zoora Shah case shows the problem of 
applying conventional British legal categories to individual migrants trapped in 
traditional expectations about honour and shame. From the moment that Zoora Shah left 
her husband she was an outcast in a conservative Muslim community like Manningham; 
her lawyers argued that she acted out of desperation but the judge found her to be fully 
responsible for her actions. Most of all though, the Zoora Shah case illustrates the social 
frictions bubbling below the surface in Manningham as Britain modernises, as parts of the 
ethnic communities shift into the middle class and others are left behind – the case is 
atypical only in its extreme finale and the fact that it became public.

Lord Ouseley’s *Bradford Race Review* (http://www.bradford2020.com/pride/) asks the 
question: Why is community fragmentation along social, cultural, ethnic and religious 
lines occurring in the Bradford district? The phrasing of the question and the context of 
the report suggests that this fragmentation is something new and that unity was the 
natural state of affairs. In fact, apart from the first 8–10 years of settlement, fission was 
always the natural condition. The geographical contours – Manningham and the 
neighbouring districts – remained but, after the closure of the mills, the arrival of women 
and establishment of families, the Pakistani community lost much of its solidarity. 
Mosques sprung up, sometimes in old mills and warehouses, and neighbourhoods defined 
themselves according to the nearest place of worship. Parents sought out the imam for 
the religious schooling of their children. Village kinships from the homeland began to 
play a role as Pakistanis entered council politics.

**Why Kreuzberg?**

‘They had no choice’, explains Yolanda Arias from a *Quartiersmanagement* in Berlin-
Kreuzberg, a state-organized neighbourhood management project. When the Turkish 
*Gastarbeiter* arrived in Berlin in the 1960s, the Kreuzberg area was relatively cheap and 
offered spacious housing.

The east of Kreuzberg has always been a workers’ district. In the early 19th century, and 
increasingly with industrialization, people moved from the rural areas to Berlin to find 
work. As Kreuzberg remained largely intact during the wars, many of the old houses from 
the 19th and early 20th century were still available. Few new houses were built in the 
1950s and 1960s.

The river Spree, easily accessible, was used for transportation of goods and as a water 
reservoir and thus proved highly attractive for industry in the 19th century. Canals were 
extended, the number of factories and companies in the area quickly increased: 
Kreuzberg offered an ideal location and a ready workforce. These are the roots of 
‘Luisenstadt’ as the east of Kreuzberg was called until 1920 – a workers’ district with many 
small businesses involved in manufacturing industry.
The population increase due to the flight from the countryside was faster than the construction of new housing. The average time for building a new house was cut to six months. The opening of the Görlitzer Bahnhof in 1867 – connecting Görlitz to Berlin on a 208 km route – encouraged a high number of immigrants from Silesia to settle in Luisenstadt. A tariff wall encircling the area was torn down. The Görlitzer Bahnhof district developed rapidly. In the year 1871, Berlin counted 100,000 new immigrants. Living conditions were disastrous. The first tenements were set up around the Kottbusser Tor; mass housing was professionally organized.

Taxes were to be paid according to the size of the front façades – as opposed to the size of the actual site – which encouraged the construction of Kreuzberg’s typical back alleys with side wing and back wing housing. The dark and narrow Mietskasernen (tenement apartments) would later make cheap housing for the Turkish Gastarbeiter.

In 1925, 22,000 businesses were registered in Kreuzberg, mainly printing and engineering. The world economic crisis hit the working-class district Kreuzberg hard – shop keepers, civil servants, former soldiers. Many voted for the NSDAP. In 1933, the ‘National Socialist German Workers Party’ received 32.8% of votes in Kreuzberg. Many Jewish businesses which had been set up around the Kottbusser Tor were boycotted and eventually taken over by Nazis. When the Nazis took power, about 160,000 citizens of Jewish origin lived in Berlin. In 1945 there were 6,000 left.

Kreuzberg was affected by the building of the Berlin Wall more than any other city neighbourhood. The concrete border, constructed in 1961, turned the former inner city area into the city margin. In 1963 the Berlin Senate announced its first urban renewal programme: 43,000 apartments to be torn down within 10–15 years, 24,000 to be built; Kreuzberg was one of the targeted districts. As a result, people stopped investing in old buildings. If they could afford it, they fled to the green suburbs.

The change in Kreuzberg’s status coincided with the first wave of Turkish Gastarbeiter. The German-Turkish recruitment-agreement of October 1961 provided for the arrival of thousands of workers (to West-Berlin only after 1964). Article 9 stipulated that they could only stay two years. A liaison office was set up in Istanbul to monitor applicants. The Turkish interpreter Sim San remembers dealing with the crowds: ‘Selection for Germany was conducted on the principle of ten-for-one. If a German company needed 10 workers, we would interview and medically examine 100 candidates.’ The main customer was Deutsche Bundesbahn which needed an army of cleaners for its new rolling stock.

They duly arrived in Kreuzberg. For the Senate it seemed like the perfect solution since the workers would have to leave in two years and the houses could be torn down.
afterwards. But this soon proved to be a miscalculation. Although some CDU (Christian Democratic Union) politicians tried to push through a ‘rotation’-principle – replacing workers every two years with younger workers – German industry revolted. They would have to pay to train a wave of workers again and again – it was much better to keep the ‘guests’ indefinitely.

Chancellor Ludwig Erhard said that, if Germans worked an extra hour every day, no foreign workers would be needed at all. But ordinary Germans, though suspicious of the Turks, were already reaping the benefits of a fresh, cheap labour force. According to the migration specialist, Friedrich Heckmann, between 1960 and 1970 around 2.3 million Germans were upwardly mobile, shifting from blue-collar to white-collar work. Thanks to foreign labour, the economy grew; Germans worked shorter hours; the Turks paid taxes yet made little use of the social welfare state.

By 1973 Germany was in a similar position to Britain before the 1962 Immigration Act. The Bonn government announced a halt to further foreign employment but – for the first time – said it was ready to integrate more thoroughly those foreigner families already in the country. The effect, as in Britain, was instantaneous: Turks did their utmost to bring their families to Berlin. In 1975 another anti-immigration measure backfired. The government cut the amount of child support paid to the absent offspring of Turks working in Germany. Again, Turkish workers reacted by summoning their children. The age of the commuting guest worker was over. The Turks had decided, for better or for worse, to stay. The streets of Kreuzberg started to fill with Turkish children playing hopscotch on the pavements.

In 2004, Yolanda Arias describes a situation which matches that of 1977. In relative terms, little has changed: ‘Kreuzberg has about the lowest average income in Berlin, the highest percentage of children and, at the same time, ranks lowest in terms of playgrounds. Housing conditions are among the worst.’ In fact, the area around the Kottbusser Tor registers, according to official statistics, the lowest income level, highest number of unemployed (24%), highest number of welfare recipients (15.9%) and highest population density. Compared with the rest of the city, Kreuzberg also ranks highest in terms of poverty (26.4%).

Some local politicians complain that there are not enough nursery and grammar schools. But Martin Düsphol of the Kreuzberg Museum points out that this is not the whole story. ‘The number of nursery and grammar schools is relatively in balance with the population. The problem is rather that child care costs money – and many families whose children would profit from language skills learned at kindergarten are not ready to invest.’

Until the late 1970s the population in Kreuzberg dropped. However, the rebellious 1970s brought new people: squatters who rubbed shoulders uneasily with the Turks. In May 1981, 168 houses were taken over in Berlin by squatters, 86 of which were in Kreuzberg. Further urban renewal programmes followed: Street Slaughtering (Straßenschlachtung. Geschichte, Abriss und gebrochenes Weiterleben der Admiralstrasse) is the title of a book by city planner Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm: The Tale of a District that has absorbed €1.5 billion of public funding in construction.

By 1981, the mood was becoming distinctly hostile to the Turks. The most gentle face of government policy was displayed by Richard von Weizsäcker when he made his inauguration speech as Mayor of Berlin (2 July 1981) – in the same year he created in the
City of Berlin the position of a Commissioner for Foreigners. The Turks, he said, had the choice ‘of returning to their homeland, which we will support with material incentives, or staying in Berlin. If they stay that must involve a commitment to becoming Germans.’ But Berlin Interior Senator Heinrich Lummer showed the real teeth, setting out measures to deport foreigners. The expression ‘the boat is full’ began to make the rounds.

In Kreuzberg, the Turks were uneasy. But within the neighbourhood an informal version of multiculturalism – before it became doctrinal or stifling government policy – was starting to take root. At the level of street protest Turkish and Kurdish radicals were making common cause with the anarchic protestors who were squatting in the tenements. Every May Day (since 1987) they riot, smashing police vans and restaurants. Their mutual enemy is ‘the state’ and it has sparked (German) bands like Ton, Steine and Scherben, who initiated a movement in 1971, as well as (Turkish) hip-hop. At a more sedate level, young German families bought into the multicultural idea.

Does Kreuzberg – the birthplace of the German idea of multiculturalism – live up to its principles? Living in Kreuzberg is associated with being young and tolerant. ‘Parents like the idea of sending their children to a multicultural nursery school,’ says Arias, ‘They buy their vegetables at their local Turkish corner store, experiment with Turkish recipes and greet their Turkish neighbours on the street. The crucial point for young families is reached when their kids get into grammar school. That is the moment when young families of German origin move to other neighbourhoods, or simply send their children to schools in a different, more German neighbourhood.’

The International Building Exhibition held in Kreuzberg in 1984–87 prompted a new round of urban renewal: 1,000 more nursery school places were created, investment boosted in schools and youth centres, playgrounds expanded and licences for sex shops restricted. Kreuzberg thus presented itself as a counter-weight to a broadly anti-immigrant policy taking shape at a federal level. It also offered something more: a district that set itself apart from a society seemingly hostile to children and ethnic diversity.

Germany’s reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall marks a turning point: Kreuzberg was back at the city centre. The Mythos Kreuzberg – multi-ethnic, young, alternative, rebellious – remains attractive for people from all over Germany, the result of which was a pressure on the housing market. Office space became increasingly expensive. Large sums of public funding were suspended and went to the former East Berlin neighbourhoods instead. In 1995, it announced a cap on public expenditure which has become a permanent annual feature.

The latest deterioration of Kreuzberg occurred against a backdrop of confused asylum and immigration policy. The end of communism released a flood of Aussiedler – mainly Russians of ethnic German origin who, under the citizenship laws, are entitled to become fully fledged Germans almost automatically. Since 1990 over 750,000 such children and teenagers have arrived in Germany. In Berlin they have been settling in poorer districts such as Wedding and Neukölln as well as in Kreuzberg. Most speak German only poorly yet they have a privileged status compared to the Turks. In schools, in street gangs, in the drug-dealing milieus, this is a source of real and often violent conflict. Crime statistics distort or conceal these daily conflicts. ‘Say some Auslandsdeutsche from Kazakstan gangs up on a Turk, the Turk draws a knife, cuts one of their hands and the rest scarper,’ says Mehmet, a 17-year-old who has been guiding us around the Kottbusser Tor, ‘The police arrive – you know, typical Saturday night, and the incident is recorded as foreigner (Turk)
attacks German.’ The pecking-order struggle takes place too between casual workers: it is easier for a Russian German to get working papers than for a Turk.

The bloody Balkan wars brought another immigrant factor into play: the arrival of 300,000 Bosnian refugees and tens of thousands from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Many of the Bosnians have returned, but those who worked illegally in Berlin often did so alongside Turks. These are complex constellations, more fluid than anything experienced by the Pakistanis in Bradford. The Turks feel increasingly at home, yet it seems to them a home with shifting foundations. The next challenge to their security will be the arrival of East Europeans as full EU citizens; with Turkey many years away from membership, they will again feel as if they are slipping down the ladder.

Little wonder that Berlin remains a universe of parallel worlds, also of poor worlds, concluded the Berlin journalist, Rüdiger Soldt, in 2002. The former West-Berlin neighbourhoods Neukölln, Wedding and Kreuzberg – all of them with a high density of Turkish inhabitants – are the poorhouses of the city. Their average income level is lower even than in the former East-Berlin neighbourhoods.

The local police ranks the area around Kottbusser Tor among the 36 officially declared ‘hot spots’ in the city: drug trading, regular muggings and raids. Many Berliners see the Turks to be the main problem. A total of 33% of Kreuzberg’s inhabitants are of Turkish or Arabic origin, not counting the naturalized Turks. They make up a third of the population and 42% of them are unemployed. Thousands lost their jobs after reunification to their East German colleagues who were allowed to work for lower wages.
3 Passport to a new world – citizenship in Britain and Germany

The world of Ayfer Durur did not change when she became a German citizen: ‘It didn’t suddenly give me a new identity and I didn’t lose my old one,’ she says, ‘I did it to please my parents, to show them that I had arrived, even if they hadn’t.’ The critical point for Durur – now a fashionable hairdresser in Berlin – came when she needed cash to set up her own business. Blocked by the banks she turned to her parents, who had been in the first wave of Turkish Gastarbeiter to Germany. The money they had been saving to build a house in their Anatolian village was given instead to their daughter: not only an expression of trust in her talent, but also in a German future. For younger and increasingly for older immigrant Turks, the connection with the Turkish motherland is a pragmatic rather than a sentimental one. What can Turkey offer us? What can Germany? Citizenship – German, or German-Turkish – is becoming irrelevant to the key questions of integration and identity. For the Pakistanis of Bradford, whose British citizenship is automatic, the shading of the passport has even less bearing on his or her sense of self. Ahmood, whom we find drinking coffee in Le Bleu Café on the fringes of Manningham, says he’s British:

‘But only because I’m British-born. If I didn’t say that I would have to say I’m Pakistani and I’m not that, I mean General Musharraf and all that. It depends who asks: I can be British Asian, British Pakistani – though that sounds stupid – a Muslim, a British Muslim. Mainly what I’m most comfortable with: Bradfordian. This is my home.’

What then does citizenship give Ahmood or other British Pakistanis? It affords a certain level of protection abroad:

‘When I’m in Spain on holiday it makes me feel more European than Asian, I go through without a passport and, if I’m in trouble I suppose the British consulate looks after me. What would happen if I had a Pakistani passport? It doesn’t bear thinking about.’

British citizenship also translates into a degree of political influence for Pakistanis not experienced by Turks in Germany. Over 80% of adult Pakistanis are on electoral registers and election turnout hovers at around 75%. Pakistanis traditionally supported the Labour Party but backing dropped from over 80% in the 1970s to barely 50% in the 1990s. This could reflect some social mobility – more self-employed, home-owning Pakistanis switching to the Conservatives – or it could indicate a closer identification with Muslim politics and disappointment with the Labour Party’s attitudes towards Islam. There is a clear line that stretches from Labour’s perceived lack of understanding about Muslim anger against Salman Rushdie to Tony Blair’s support of the Afghan and Iraq wars. Asian voters are starting to lose their enthusiasm for the British political process; some are staying at home, others are being drawn more closely into Muslim politics.

For Turks in Germany, the British model of citizenship has been little more than a dream for four decades. Now German citizenship is easier – and it lacks lustre. What does legal protection abroad mean in practice?
How much significance do expanded political powers have at a time of widespread political apathy or disaffection with the political class? Citizenship for a Berlin Turk has the attraction of opening up public sector or civil servant jobs which are currently reserved for EU-citizens – army and police officers, postmen etc. But how far are these jobs actually being taken up by British Pakistanis? Theoretical options are opened up by British citizenship yet the Asian unemployment rate in Bradford is comparable to that of Turks in Berlin.

British Asians seem to concentrate more on the erosion of citizenship rights than on their relative advantages compared to ethnic minorities in other European countries. It is not a sense of privilege but of steady disadvantage: ‘Post-war Britain was in dire need of our labour,’ says Dr. A. Sivanandan, ‘and to facilitate that the Nationality Act of 1948 made us all British citizens. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 was the first step towards dismantling that citizenship – what it said, in effect, was that Britain needed our labour, not us.’ One does not have to follow Dr. Sivanandan’s somewhat labyrinthic logic – whereby closer definition of citizenship is tantamount to ‘state racism’ which in turn breeds ‘institutional racism’ – to sense a paradox. As British Pakistanis feel that at least one facet of their identity is slipping away, so Turkish Germans are suspicious of the gradual opening of Germany’s citizenship rules. Neither the Bradford Pakistanis nor the

### Arranged marriages vs. forced marriages

An *arranged marriage* is based on the consent of both parties. While young Germans as well as white Britons object to the idea of parental interference, some second and third generation British Asians as well as some young Turks do not mistrust the tradition as such. In fact, most young people in Bradford’s Pakistani community are happy with the concept of arranged marriages, according to a study commissioned by the Foreign Office and undertaken by academics from Bradford University. Among the second generation Turkish community, around 40% found their partners within their own families.

In a *forced marriage* consent is not given. Teenagers are often caught between the western idea of independence and free choice and traditional values.

‘Papataya’ in Berlin is the only asylum for runaways in Germany. Some 80 to 100 Muslim girls a year make use of the institution, and 50% of the girls are of Turkish origin. The Berlin Senate estimates that 250 girls in the German capital were forced into marriage in the last year.

At least 1,000 young British-Asian women a year are said to be forced into marriage. Bradford police deal with 70 cases annually. In Britain, the Community Liaison Unit of the Foreign Office deals with some 200 forced-marriage cases a year, many of which involve the repatriation of a U.K. national who has been taken abroad against her will. The British government recently decided to tackle the overseas dimension of forced marriages. British teenagers abroad are advised to contact British authorities in cases of forced marriages. In some cases the British consulate can help to bring their citizens back to Britain. Asian teenagers are advised to leave contact details before going on a family visit to Pakistan.
Kreuzberg Turks are satisfied with the way that they are being pigeonholed by the state. The new rules in Germany are a first tentative departure from the principles set out in 1913 in the imperial and state citizenship law. Germans qualified as German citizens through their blood line. Naturalization was very restricted and regarded as an exceptional case to be decided upon only after long bureaucratic deliberation. From January 2000 Germany accepted the right to citizenship of children born in Germany of foreign parents. The state has thus acknowledged that the Gastarbeiter and their children have made a permanent home in Germany; more, it recognizes the potential instability arising from swelling immigrant minorities without political rights. The terms of this naturalized citizenship are set out in a cheerful but oddly sinister government webpage: 'Naturalized Germans will receive civic rights like the right to vote, the right to choose one's profession, protection from extradition and expulsion.’ The unstated thought is that those foreigners who do not seek German citizenship but want to live there may not enjoy those rights. Parents living permanently and legally in Germany can qualify for citizenship; if their children were born in Germany in the past 10 years, their parents can apply on their behalf. The children can retain double citizenship until the age of 18 and then have to renounce one of their passports. Unlike Britain there is no tolerance of long-standing double nationality. Foreigners not born in Germany can also apply for citizenship after living in the country for at least eight years. All candidates for citizenship have to pass language tests and swear loyalty to the constitution.

Despite thewariness about foreign residents who want to keep their foreign identity, the law is not bad; certainly it edges Germany at last towards the European norm. Yet the fact is very few foreigners – and in particular very few Turks – are taking up the offer. In 2002, only about 730,000 (27.6%) of 2.64 million people of Turkish origin in Germany held German citizenship (compared to almost 34% of Turks taking up their host countries’ citizenship in Europe). In part this is because of the rights that would have to be renounced in Turkey, and the complications of inheriting property in the motherland. Mainly though, the reluctance stems from an instrumental understanding of German citizenship. What advantages does it bring, what unacceptable duties and responsibilities? Sometimes this boils down to the question of which village one came from or how many dependent relatives are still alive in Turkey. For Metin Özbek, one of the 1970s generation of Gastarbeiter, citizenship serves as an anchor: ‘I’m 63 now and Kreuzberg has become my home. I want to make sure I get my full pension rights and that some future government doesn’t decide to throw me out.’ He beats his cardiganed chest: ‘Inside I’ll always be a Turk.’ The pragmatic line is also taken by Dilek who, through German citizenship, has been able to join the Berlin police force.

Both Metin and Dilek are exceptions in their willingness to use citizenship to improve their life-chances, but they also underline the lack of emotional commitment to Germany. In both Britain and Germany there is serious concern about what might be termed ‘lived citizenship’. Norman Tebbit raised the cricket test (England versus Pakistan – who do you cheer for?) and earned a few brickbats. Yet subsequent political utterances have not been much more sophisticated. The Bradford riots prompted important questions. If an ethnic minority takes to the streets because the state is failing in its perceived duty to provide equal employment, housing and educational possibilities, then there are only two possible conclusions. The first is that the state has to review its institutions – are they excluding or marginalising people on ethnic criteria? The second, and more complex is why do the rebellious minorities have solely a performance-orientated view of the state? Why is their British-ness so conditional? The concept of ‘cohesive communities’ set out by the Bradford Race Review in the wake of the Bradford riots is based on a rather unclear
notion of shared British-ness: ‘Common citizenship does not mean cultural uniformity. Our society is multicultural [...] there is no single dominant and unchanging culture into which all must assimilate.’ So what is modern citizenship? A trapeze act: ‘Citizenship means finding a common place for diverse cultures and beliefs, consistent with our core values.’

The race and immigration debate is shifting quickly towards the question of three core values. All European countries have been sucked into the discussion. France drew on values rooted in the republican revolution when it banned Muslim headscarves in schools: the principle of strict separation of church and state seemed to most French citizens to outpoint the freedom to identify publicly with a specific religious or ethnic profile: Neither Britain nor Germany face such straightforward choices. In both countries the discussion about core values – Who are we? Who does not belong? What values do we share? – has become tangled with the pragmatic issues raised by the friction in race relations. It takes a race riot in northern England to prompt a discussion about national identity.

It took the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States to move Britain and Germany towards setting some demarcation lines between the supposedly Christian-based host country values and the Islamic traditions of immigrants. The Leitkultur debate in Germany began somewhat earlier in October 2000 – when Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democrats stressed that Islamic schools should be supervised by the German state and that Muslim circumcision was unacceptable. Merz was attacked by Paul Spiegel, Chairman of the Central Council of Jews and by President Rau. The Germans should not attempt to ‘play number one’ in Germany, said the President. The CDU Secretary General, Laurenz Meyer, advised the President not to ‘interfere in daily politics’. He, for one, was ‘proud to be a German’. The President in turn declared that he was not proud to be a German – one could only be proud of something one had achieved. The Leitkultur debate – whose values should set the tone for an immigrant community – had thus already given way to a debate about national pride by September 11. The attacks brought the Leitkultur arguments out of a right-wing niche into the mainstream. Social Democratic Interior Minister, Otto Schily, one of the main Green proponents in the 1980s of a multicultural society, championed the new cautious order. Muslim inhabitants of Germany were essentially divided into those who were supportive of the German system – ‘Verfassungspatrioten’ or constitutional patriots in the phrase coined by Jürgen Habermas – and those who rejected German values.

But what exactly were those values? And who should define them? September 11 ensured that this process of differentiation, central to the development of the Turkish minority, passed into the hands of the police, the Verfassungsschutz (Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) and the state prosecutors. Mosques became, and remain, an object of suspicion. The religious Turk in Kreuzberg feels uneasy; the non-religious Turk has only been brushed by events but senses a hardening of the bureaucracy against him. The state is beginning to intrude on everyday life.

A similar progression took place in Britain. The Bradford riots in the summer of 2001 had already signalled to the government that the so-called ‘multiculturalist settlement’ was no longer working. September 11 accelerated the search for a new formula which found its expression in the Cantle report of December 2001, Community Cohesion (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/cohesion/). Home Secretary David Blunkett, also in December 2001, announced government plans for an oath of allegiance by immigrants

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and for compulsory English language testing. There had, he said, been an over-emphasis among ethnic minority communities towards establishing ‘cultural differences’ and ‘moral relativism’. The Muslim minorities were growing away from, rather than together with, the British mainstream. The state was therefore ready again to assert its authority. Yet this muscle was being flexed for the sole purpose of keeping order in Bradford and other troubled townships. And its aim was to differentiate between Muslims willing to integrate more closely and those determined to live a parallel existence – rather than charting out a new, more active concept of British citizenship.

The common ground in the British and German debate was the shared conviction that multiculturalism – an idea that had guided race relations for two decades – was no longer functioning. Neither government however has come up with a plausible alternative; our impression from Bradford and Berlin is that Germany is more willing than Britain to hang on to the multicultural idea. The reason may be that British suspicion about multiculturalism comes from both ends: from a government alarmed at the growing of so-called parallel societies, and from those in the ethnic communities who believe that multiculturalism has become an instrument of control. Originally multiculturalism was viewed as being an answer to Enoch Powell, an assertion that non-white communities have an important and enduring role in Britain. But as new generations emerged they wanted more: ‘Those who were born and grew up here wanted to remake society and not just be tolerated within it,’ says Arun Kundnani. ‘The uprisings of the early 1980s were the most obvious expression of this shift. And at this point, multiculturalism changed from a line of defence to a mode of control.’ Multiculturalism, says Kundnani, thus came to mean taking black or Asian culture off the streets – ‘where it had been politicized and turned into a rebellion against the state’ – and rendering it harmless, ‘putting it in the council chamber, in the classroom and on television where it could be institutionalized, managed and reified. The state than tried to recruit and co-opt ethnic minority representatives – given free rein within their own realm providing they abstained from radical activism,’ Kundnani argues, ‘It was a colonial arrangement.’

Grants and project funding became a source of competition between different ethnic groups, fragmenting mixed communities ‘horizontally by ethnicity, vertically by class’. That seems to us rather a sour reading of multiculturalism but it is a view shared by many ethnic community activists. The rise of ‘parallel societies’ is seen as a direct consequence of the break-up of the multicultural by both the state and the ethnic community organizers. Germany has not had to confront these issues quite so starkly since there have been no riots or open confrontation on the scale of Bradford or Oldham. Our reporting from Kreuzberg will try to answer why this is; our fear is that as the German authorities gradually attempt to extend citizenship rights, and as Turkey itself edges closer to the European Union (early pre-negotiation talks could start in 2005), so expectations will rise and the German state will lack the means and even the vocabulary to deal with the demands of ethnic Turks. Then German cities will face the troubles experienced in Britain.

Certainly there has been a similar erosion of multicultural values. The lives of the suicide pilots of the so-called Hamburg cell that attacked the United States chart the shift in mentality. One played football in his local German club, another used to flirt with his landlady, while ringleader Mohammed Atta was regarded as a star pupil. Gradually they became part of a mosque-centred micro-world and barely interacted with Germans. They moved from a multicultural into a parallel society, and nobody noticed because the same had been happening across the country. The idea that a more closely defined notion of citizenship – ‘cohesive citizenship’ in the post-Bradford term – could provide a way back
is risible. Mohammed Atta, for example, would soon have qualified for German citizenship – his grasp of the German language was excellent. The Cantle report urges the state to tackle the institutional problems – education, housing and employment – and make citizenship into a kind of charter of opportunity for British Asians. The compact seems to be on the lines of ‘we will try harder to accommodate your needs – in return we ask you to take up the chances on offer’. Seen from outside Britain, the Cantle report looks very thin. Certainly, the concept of ‘cohesive citizenship’ cannot be exported to Germany in its present sketchy form.

Our case is that practical multiculturalism, the simple business of side-by-side daily existence and commerce, still has some life in it. The state, by trying to steer it, by channelling money to some groups and neglecting others, has poisoned the idea. It should confine itself to removing the obstacles to social mobility within neighbourhoods dominated by ethnic minorities. The Bradford Pakistani writer, Yunis Alam, makes a case for the imperfections of a multi-ethnic city. The state should accept the resulting frictions as a source of positive energy. Bradford, he says, is vibrant:

‘It’s a very multicultural city and the more people you have, even if you’ve got a city of people with the same ethnicity, the more chance there is going to be conflict. Once you start putting differences in there is going to be a greater chance of conflict arising. That’s what multiculturalism is, but that doesn’t mean you don’t do it, it doesn’t mean you don’t rise to the challenge of living in a diverse community, a diverse city.’

Something, in other words, is working in Bradford: it is unquantifiable and it is largely resistant to state guidance, but it stems from ethnic co-operation and competition. The same goes for Berlin-Kreuzberg. Our reporting there suggests that the Turkish community has become the most dynamic part of the capital. Freeing those energies in the two cities will, we believe, teach us more about integration of minorities than tangled debates about the limits of citizenship, the question most posed in these cities is not ‘Who am I?’ but rather ‘Where am I going?’. Identity is being shaped in a different way from 20 years ago: globalisation, the shifting borders of Europe, new technologies and new demands from the educational system have all changed the approach of immigrants to their host societies.
Out of the ghetto – social types

The riddle of migration cannot be solved using the conventional categories. Neither the Pakistanis in Bradford nor the Turks in Berlin form a monolithic group. They are divided not only by region and ethnicity (a ‘Turk’ in Berlin could be a Kurd, an Alevite, a Sunnite) but also by personality and family structure. One Kreuzberg Turkish family we encountered was made up of six children – a policeman, a shop-keeper, a drug dealer, a primary school teacher and two housewives – in which at least four different worlds intersected. The conflicts of interest, between the brothers who were policing and selling drugs, were buried in silence at the dinner table. A Pakistani family with a similar constellation saw the father taking his wayward son to the mosque. The talk with the Imam brought no success but it was a recognition that the family itself is no longer enough to resolve serious tension. The gap between the arrival-generation and the grandchildren is now too big; parental authority is melting, connections with the homeland are withering and social ambitions are changing rapidly. Moreover homeland cultures are modernising at an extraordinary pace. Mobile telephone ownership has ballooned in both Turkey and Pakistan over the past six years; an expanding urban middle class makes sophisticated use of the internet in both countries. As a result, the young adventurous man who emigrated from a Pakistani or an Anatolian village in the 1960s often finds that he can no longer keep pace with developments in the home country, or hold a meaningful conversation about the future with his children in the host country. He arrived in Britain or Germany assuming that he would be the prime wage-earner and the family hierarchy was constructed accordingly. Now this generation is becoming marginal and traditional lines of authority are breaking down.

Out of this new re-ordered migrant setting we think we can identify three main types: the achievers, the conformists and the outsiders. We found these patterns in both Bradford and Berlin; their problems, their solutions and the organization of their lives throw up some of the questions we need to be asking. What does it take to be a success? Is breaking out of the ghetto a measure of that success? In what ways is the state failing immigrants? In what ways are they failing themselves?

The achievers in our two cities have grown out of an entrepreneurial milieu. For the most part they have transcended the corner shop culture with the help of host-country education and are ready to take financial risks for financial betterment. The role of the family – as a provider of capital or networks – is crucial. The relationship to the home town (that is, Bradford or Berlin) is complex but in most cases we found that successful immigrants enrich their local community rather than desert it.

The conformists are, for us, those immigrant children who broadly accept the values of their parents and are comfortable with tradition. Typically they take over shops and, though they may introduce new commercial methods, their dreams are a refinement rather than a rejection of the values of the older generation.
The outsiders do not see themselves as such. Unemployment is disproportionately high in the Turkish and Pakistani communities; school drop-out rates are also higher. The result, in Manningham and Kreuzberg at least, is a youth sub-culture. There are gangs, a specific language, code and ritual; there is street violence and drug-related crime but also music, networking, courtships and even self-policing. Police in both Bradford and Berlin see these communities as a marginal, potentially disruptive force. The young Turks and Pakistanis, however, believe they are part of an essentially defensive urban organization: ‘We look after ourselves,’ says a Turkish gang leader, ‘because nobody else does.’

The short biographies we present are of real people, not stereotypes. Each raises some questions about how much responsibility the state should take for the integration of its immigrants.

The upwardly mobile in Bradford

Irfan Ajeeb is a Yummie: a Young and Upwardly Mobile Muslim. Shiny shirt and slicked-back hair, he was brimming with pride when he met us at the Bradford National Museum of Photography, Film and Television. He is the moving spirit of the ‘Bite the Mango’ film festival featuring international, among them many Asian, films and his hope was that the expanding festival would clinch Bradford’s bid to be European City of Culture 2008.

It was not to be – Liverpool won the honour – but the very idea that Bradford was on the brink of transforming itself from the Capital of Curry to the Capital of Culture was enough to spark national astonishment. Yet the Asian community has always been drawn to the cinema. Bradford was merely tapping into a modern tradition, acknowledging that its Asian dimension could make it more internationally attractive.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Bradford had between a dozen and two dozen cinemas showing Asian films. Films were often the only source of relaxation for Asians. ‘You had people travelling from all over the country – they made a day of it just to come to the cinema and really experience something unusual,’ explains Ajeeb, ‘It was unusual at that time because you had three-hour epic movies full of dance, full of colour, emotion and romance, and shot in India and Pakistan. A part of the reason why they were so popular was because people would reminisce about things back home. My mum and dad described how they used to go to the cinema and when they came out they used to see loads of people crying and remembering how it used to be back in the village.’

Now Pakistani and Indian audiences have become more demanding and attached to new technology. A survey by Sky TV found that British Asians are twice as likely as other British families to have DVD-players (31%, more than double the UK average) and more likely to have PCs, game consoles and internet connections (three out of four compared to a national average of 50%). ‘The figures highlight an increasingly competitive streak among Asian families,’ says Ajeeb, ‘When people become successful businessmen or professionals they want to be seen to have the best equipment in their homes. They want to be better than next door. I don’t know of a single Asian family now that doesn’t have a DVD player.’

Nonetheless, the cinema still plays an important part in the lives of young Asians; it is a place for courtship and for the shaping of romantic dreams and ideals. Ajeeb, who
studied Graphic Design in Manchester before returning to Bradford to be the director of the Mango festival – he is also a well-known film critic at Bradford’s ‘Asian Eye’ – quickly understood that Bollywood could be a bridge between Yorkshire and the sub-continent. Bollywood is India’s musical, heavily stylized answer to Hollywood. ‘The Bollywood filmmakers really understand what they’re doing – they go for the mass audience,’ Ajeeb says, Whenever I go the excitement is still there at the same level. It just brings me back to when I was a child and celebrating Eid or Christmas and looking forward to presents.’ This enthusiasm brought him closer to Asian film production, first to Bombay, the centre of the Indian film industry, and then on to Lahore, home town of Lollywood, the Pakistani equivalent to Bollywood. ‘I met some absolutely amazing young documentary filmmakers in Lahore and Karachi,’ says Ajeeb. But he recognized that the Indian film-makers are ahead – bigger audiences, better budgets. ‘The Pakistanis are struggling to keep up … it will take another 15 years before a Pakistani actor can appear in an Indian film.’

Ajeeb’s entrepreneurial talent has been to attract film-makers from the sub-continent to take Bradford seriously. And in so doing he has accepted the need to work, as a Pakistani, together with Indians, to accept the market leadership of the Indians. One key to Pakistani mobility may therefore be to embrace a label applied by the host country – to present himself as a British-Asian entrepreneur rather than a Pakistani.

There are two other ingredients to his success. First of all, he is not just the director of the film festival. He is also the son of the first Asian Lord Mayor of Bradford, Mohammed Ajeeb:

‘Obviously I was quite young at the time so I did not really appreciate and understand what that accomplishment meant. But for a person who was born and raised in a village, who came here with hardly anything, to become the “first citizen of Bradford” was like saying, “Yes, we’ve finally arrived here, they’ve accepted us — we’re here to stay.”’ (Irfan Ajeeb)

The network created by Ajeeb senior inside the ethnic communities – no one can hope to become Mayor without broad support across the Asian spectrum – helped him forge links not only between Pakistan and Bradford but also India. Funding becomes easier as the son of a former Mayor; so does political support from the council.

Second, Ajeeb is consciously taking part in the re-branding of Bradford. A ‘multicultural’ image sits well with the image of ‘new media’. Together they form an upbeat modern face to the old wool town. Asian entrepreneurs, like their Turkish equivalents in Germany, are quick to spot a market niche. And they are teaching Bradford how to make an asset out of its Asian-ness.

Transcending tradition
In the age of communication, young British Asians have updated the tradition of arranged marriages into the concept of e-ranged marriages: online dating services and marriage bureaux provide platforms for young British Asians to choose partners.
Ajeeb seems to be in stark contrast to Omar Khan who has taken a more conventional route to commercial success – setting up a curry house. But on closer examination he uses similar techniques to Ajeeb: cross-over cuisine for a cross-over clientele. He is the son of a Pakistani army officer who came to Britain in the 1940s. His technique provides a model: he adapted his business to white British tastes, co-operated with Indians, used family start-up capital and took part in the process of renewal of Bradford. He and his two brothers started three restaurants by the name of Shahgehan: ‘Once we were successful, the name was taken over by other restaurants.’ The name Omar Khan is his own, officially registered now. Khan has managed to integrate Pakistani dishes into the British menu: ‘“Medium-hot” is the key to British taste buds.’ This apparently pleases Khan’s most famous guests – John Prescott and Tony Blair – as well as his most frequent – white middle-class Bradfordians, academics from nearby Bradford University. The restaurant is a ‘safe’ island in the otherwise ‘no-go-area’, the university ward. ‘My aim is to make the city better,’ says Khan, ‘We need more policing. Policing has gone haywire.’ Khan’s future plans include an ‘Omar Khan’-brand for frozen food supplied by supermarkets and a chef school located in his restaurant to ‘take young people up the ladder’.

The upwardly mobile in Kreuzberg

Only the name of Berlin’s exclusive restaurant Trenta Sei reminds one of SO36 – a district name that is kept alive from the former postal code of Kreuzberg-East. The idea is of Turkish origin, the concept Italian, the guests mostly German, the style affluent: Turkish-born Hassan Ulutürk – who also owns the 925 Lounge Bar next door which displays a 925-carat silver plate on its counter – followed his gut feeling when he opened his restaurant in the mid-1990s. At that time, the area around Gendarmenmarkt was expected to end up as a culinary desert. ‘When we bought the property,’ he said, ‘nobody believed the area could become as lively as it is now.’

Ulutürk took the risk: ‘All you need is talent and a good concept. And the talent to sell your concept.’ But German banks could not be convinced: Ulutürk gathered his starting capital with the support of his social network. The rest of the money came from his first entrepreneurial success, a so-called Pasta Bar in an affluent West-Berlin neighbourhood – which he had run for some years together with three friends until every one of them went into a different profession – provided him with the necessary financial resources once it was sold. The pasta bar also gave him another important insight: German diners lack the stomach for Turkish cuisine, they prefer Italian food. That’s why the menu is Italian.

Hassan Ulutürk’s father was a steel worker from eastern Anatolia. Like many of his colleagues at work, Ulutürk’s father commuted between Turkey and Germany for many years until he eventually decided to settle with his family in Berlin-Kreuzberg. ‘We were six children at home,’ says Ulutürk. His two brothers work in public service, his three sisters are married and have families. Hassan Ulutürk, 35-years-old, is only settled in his ambitions: ‘Maybe New York will be my next step, who knows?’, he says with entrepreneurial enthusiasm.

Is there anything Turkish to be traced in this place? ‘I like Turkey, I like my Turkish friends and I like Kreuzberg,’ says Ulutürk who speaks German without any accent and whose Porsche is parked in front of the restaurant, ‘Some of my friends live in Kreuzberg, I go
there regularly.’ But the bar’s interior is international, urban style. Ulutürk recently moved into an apartment around the corner from his restaurant, in the trendy neighbourhood of Berlin-Mitte. He comments that ‘People always ask me whether I feel Turkish or German – I’m a Berliner.’ His restaurant, consequently, is a Berlin restaurant.

At least the Berlin celebrity scene considers this stylish venue to be their place. TV and film actors, media representatives as well as lawyers and real estate people make up the core of guests. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer have signed the guest book. ‘Michael Jackson came here when he was in Berlin,’ says one of the waiters in a smart blue suit.

Sinking into one of the elegant red leather chairs and looking through the huge glass façade of the 925 Lounge Bar – which looks on to the illuminated Gendarmenmarkt and its classical buildings – Hakan Uzun can almost see the windows of his own business: in the last remaining old building on Gendarmenmarkt facing the Hilton Hotel, the 33-year-old set up his private clinic for cosmetic dentistry in 2001.

Hakan Uzun was born in southwest Anatolia. When he was seven years old, his father was appointed Turkish education attaché and sent to Berlin. ‘As a foreigner you always have to prove yourself to others,’ he says, ‘It starts in school: you always have to show your teacher, your classmates and yourself what you can actually do.’ Uzun studied dentistry at Berlin’s Free University. He opened his first practice in 1999 at the age of 29.

‘There have been remarkable changes over the last years,’ says Hakan Uzun, who is a member of the Turkish Business Association, ‘Business people of Turkish origin have become more self-confident. They aim for better qualifications and enter the market at a higher level. At the same time, the number of business close-downs is decreasing. The risk-taking mentality has sometimes led to a business “jungle”’.

The high number of business start-ups was always accompanied by an equally high number of business close-downs: ‘Turkish entrepreneurs are increasingly investing in business plans, evaluating their business concepts in advance’, says Uzun.

During the years 1985 – 2000, the number of Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany increased from 22,000 to almost 59,000, according to the Centre for Turkish Studies in Essen.

The late 1990s start-up wave among young entrepreneurs in Germany culminated in an economic depression, with remarkable psychological effects. The freedom of self-employment was, whenever possible, replaced by the security of a work contract. Unlike the Germans, Turkish business people stuck to their entrepreneurial ways during the economic crisis.

‘Take a stroll down Simon-Dach-Straße in Berlin-Friedrichhain,’ recommends Cem Sey, a Berlin journalist of Turkish origin. This street is famous for being the only lively spot in the former East Berlin neighbourhood. Sey has followed the developments of Turkish entrepreneurship in Berlin for many years: ‘12 out of 13 cafés and restaurants are under Turkish ownership or at least under Turkish management.’ On a Berlin map Sey points out the new culinary leaders in Kreuzberg, Schöneberg, Mitte and Friedrichshain. A common theme of the gastronomic success story is a café-restaurant that turns into a bar-restaurant at night; the menu international; breakfast buffets on weekends; coffees, cocktails, calamaris; prices low but not too low. Those who only look out for kebab signs
in their search for Turkish businesses are on the wrong track: Café Kafka which serves the best tiramisu in town is under Turkish management. At a Vietnamese restaurant at Heinrichplatz in Kreuzberg 36, only the staff and the ingredients are Vietnamese – the manager is of Turkish origin.

The conformist in Bradford

It was their fathers and grandfathers who laid the groundwork for a new homeland. The third generation of Turks in Germany and Pakistani immigrants in Britain was born into an elaborate network of social, professional, cultural and family connections. Their mothers and fathers who had started from scratch now owned shops and cafés, they had found their ways to live, they knew their neighbourhood and some of them even understood the dynamics of their new country.

Döner shops and curry restaurants are the success stories of the immigrant communities in Germany and Britain. In 1983, Berlin had 200 kebab stores. The number doubled in the course of only five years. By the end of the 1990s, Berlin had 1,300 Turkish takeaway restaurants. The Döner-fever started in the 1970s in cities like Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne and Munich. Smaller cities picked up the trend in the 1980s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, former East Germany was taken by storm. By 1996, 10,000 Döner shops existed in Germany. The success story of the first and second generations of Turkish immigrant entrepreneurs was producing an annual turnover of around 1.8 billion euros – thus outdoing the American burger chain McDonald’s in Germany. The triumph of the South Asian corner shops and curry restaurants has similarly transformed British habits.

What is the third generation to do with the groundwork of their parents? Take it or leave it: some opt for an alternative career (academic, criminal, artistic etc.), leaving behind the ethnic niche; in other cases sons and daughters keep the family tradition alive by stepping into their fathers’ shoes. They become the heirs to their parents’ successful shops and companies.

‘I was born into this shop,’ says 35-year-old Liaqat Habib, owner of Bradford’s popular Sweet Centre. Ten customers are sitting on the ten stools along the counter, turning their backs toward the small room: five men of Pakistani origin, two white men, a black man of African origin and a woman with a headscarf talking to a South Asian woman without a headscarf. A plastic sign says in English, ‘Please order at counter’. ‘Our customers come from all areas’, says Habib. His father came to Britain from Pakistan in 1958.

A poorly paid job at a Bradford mill was the starting point of Habib senior’s career. A butcher’s shop was his second, much more profitable, job – and his first entrepreneurial experience. Six years after his arrival in the European world, Habib senior had already taken a third step in his career.

We look back to the year 1964. Bradford’s mill workers from South Asia were settling in their wards, but a few years would pass before they were joined by their wives from Pakistan. In the evenings, when the single men returned from a long working day at the mills, they gathered at the small eateries offering traditional Pakistani cuisine. And which other dish, which other taste did they miss from Pakistan? Habib senior only had to listen
carefully to what people said on the streets and at their dinner tables: ‘A place to buy the sweets that our mothers gave to us when we were little,’ the new arrivals said. Habib senior, married and father of two sons, seized his chance and opened a sweet store on Lumb Lane in Manningham which he turned into a restaurant in the 1970s. A second restaurant was opened in 1983. His two sons are gradually taking over their father’s business. Sweets have not slipped out of fashion.

New branches are springing up on the basis of the work of the first generation. A new shop will soon be launched in Sheffield – the same concept, the same recipes. Liaqat’s older brother will take over the management. He is considering moving his base to Sheffield. ‘Until then we all live together in a house nearby,’ says Liaqat: the two juniors and their wives, their children and their children’s grandfather, a family tree of three generations.

The conformist in Kreuzberg

‘I like to keep things alive.’ Ismail Kalin carefully rearranges a pile of oranges on a wooden stand, ‘My father’s pockets were empty when he came to Berlin in the 1960s. He set up this shop from scratch in order to give us, his family, a home base in Germany. I am proud to be able to continue his work.’

Ismail Kalin was a child when he started working the cash register in his father’s vegetable store every other afternoon and at weekends. He tells us:

‘I probably spent most of my lifetime within these walls. I remember my younger brother and I picking grapes out of the boxes in the storage room, or sweets from the shelves. My father would get very angry when he found out. He’s got his principles: don’t take things for granted.’

At the age of 16 Kalin left school and applied for an apprenticeship at various retail companies throughout Berlin: ‘It was a bit like “what one does” after school. To be honest though, I was never too optimistic about it.’ That was in 1993. Many Berlin companies had closed, or were forced to reduce their staff after the fall of the Wall. The young Turkish community was hit hardest by the unemployment wave – in 2002, 56% of young Berlin Turks were without jobs. Kalin says, ‘Many of my friends were frustrated or angry. Perhaps scared.’ He had already taken over a lot of his father’s work in the store: ‘I did not really care about an educational qualification at that time because I felt I knew where I was going. I saw my father’s hard work pay off. I did not see my homework at school as having the same effect.’ His father had not only created a financial basis for his own family, he had also provided a future prospect for the next generation. ‘This is my world,’ says the 27-year-old who is happy to spend a lifetime in Kreuzberg where he was born. A social network and the chance to work and make a living have settled the Turkish German in this country: ‘My only ambition is to be able to feed my family and give them a decent home. As long as the store provides enough money for that, I am a happy man running it.’
The retail sector is largest among Turkish businesses in Berlin (36% in 1999). In 1999, catering was second in the statistics (24.2%), followed by services (19.8%). Vegetable stores and kebab restaurants have become traditional Turkish businesses since the 1970s. It was the oil crisis in 1974–5 which brought the breakthrough for the skewered meat: when thousands of Turkish guest workers lost their factory jobs, many of them switched from steelworks to takeaway. ‘Colleagues and brothers-in-law would pool their money and open a Turkish restaurant,’ says Mehmet Aygün, owner of the successful Hasir restaurant which has expanded into a chain. Local legend has it that Aygün himself invented the ‘Döner Kebab’ at the age of 16. In the early 1970s, German workers had tasted their Turkish colleagues’ sandwiches and welcomed the new good-value lunch snack.

The number of Turkish vegetable and meat businesses is still increasing, their market niche stable. Yet spicing up the culinary scene in Kreuzberg and other neighbourhoods throughout Berlin is not their only achievement. The economic success of the ‘Döner’ – as it is called in Germany – has quietly brought stability to the area, and not only for the Turkish owners’ personal purses or the neighbourhood budget: ‘The whole area has become brighter’, says the Kreuzberg cobbler, Ibrahim Contur, who literally stepped into his father’s shoes. By taking over responsibility for their own lives and actually making profit out of their often small projects, people like Kalin, Contur and their fathers – business founders as well as successors – are setting examples (and often, in fact, providing job options) for the younger generation. ‘Use your fingers for work, not for blaming others,’ Kalin recalls his father saying to him when he was a little boy. None of the store owners needed the state in order to get their businesses going. Cash flows without management training, without language tests or psychological studies of stacking shelves in a supermarket.

Fatih Özdemir’s father gave up his factory job because his German colleagues ‘talked to him as if he were a dog’. The newly arrived Gastarbeiter spoke little German but understood the basics. ‘As an immigrant,’ explains the 29-year-old son, ‘you enter society at the lowest level.’ Rising is the only alternative to drowning. Özdemir took over a vegetable store from a German owner who surrendered to the competition of a local supermarket. The big advantage many Turkish businesses have is that family collectives allow flexible working hours and low personnel costs. German customers particularly appreciate the possibility of late-evening shopping while many supermarkets close at 7:00pm.

The children and grandchildren of former guest workers recall their parents’ experiences of suppression and exploitation. ‘Many young Turks want to be successful,’ says Derya Altay, manager of the German Association of the Turkish wholesale and retail business, Bundesverbandes des Türkischen Groß- und Einzelhandels, in Cologne, ‘They do not want to repeat their parents’ experience and so they retreat into an ethnic niche.’ The second and third generations of store owners, however, continue their fathers’ and grandfathers’ tradition often by expanding and elaborating the groundwork – restaurant chains, takeaways with attached restaurants, a multicultural product range from Italian olive oil and Indian curry to Spanish wine. Friends’ collectives often replace the traditional family collective, thereby sustaining personnel flexibility, family atmosphere, sincere service and the absence of the hierarchies which their parents fled by entering self-employment.
Fatih Özdemir succeeded his father and became a vegetable salesman despite his educational qualifications – he graduated from Realschule (secondary school) and speaks German, Turkish, English, French and Arabic: ‘I make good money and I am independent. I do not have to follow anyone else’s orders.’ Is Özdemir fleeing the challenges of the German job market? The question seems irrelevant: he runs a successful business with four employees. He calls himself happy. Why not?

The outsider in Bradford

‘The young kids want to be just like them: no work, golden watches, big cars, souped-up hi-fi systems, designer sportswear,’ says Nazum Latif who works as an assistant adviser for jobs@manningham, a government-sponsored job initiative at Bradford’s local community centres. A street dealer on Manningham streets earns up to £200 a night. ‘Those kids have distanced themselves from their parents’ hard-working attitude,’ says Latif. While their parents came to Britain for work, the second and third generations of British Asians are largely out of work.

Immigrants (and their descendants) are usually hit hardest by an economic recession and unemployment waves. Many young British Asians feel unwanted on the labour market. Unemployment figures run as high as 30–50% in some of the most severe pockets of deprivation. Average earnings among Muslim men are 32% lower than among non-Muslim men. Three-quarters of Pakistani children live in households earning less than half the average income.

According to Professor Muhammed Anwar of the University of Warwick, Pakistanis in Britain have the highest unemployment rate, five times more than the British average; and the crime rate is higher among them than in any other community. Fully 2% of the prisoners being held in British jails are Pakistanis, the highest for any one community.

Shattered dreams and blocked ambitions can fuel a career outside society. What do young Asian teenagers want for their future? What do they expect and how much do they trust their future? ‘I would not get a job anyway, so what the heck?’ says Sarfraz, a young British-Pakistani boy on a brand-new mountain bike in Manningham, ‘In school, I was always good at maths. But what good does that do me? I’m a street man. Things are a lot straighter on the street.’ The boy’s father is a second-generation immigrant who owns a corner store in the neighbourhood. ‘I don’t want to end up selling apples,’ the son says with a strong Yorkshire accent. Poverty, unemployment and social exclusion make up the soil on which a drug culture flourishes. ‘The police leave us alone, most of the time.’ It seems as if at least this boy’s life could have taken another course had he not been so completely disillusioned about his future on the job market. While the state cannot curtail the attractiveness of the drug scene, it can help to make alternatives more appealing.

The drug world promises a career, cash and recognition; gold watches and big cars come along with a tough-guy attitude. Members of teenage gangs start their career at the bottom as ‘runners’, delivering drugs to customers. Some of them get to ride specially bought mountain bikes. The second step on the ladder is to become a ‘street dealer’ who supplies runners and customers with their orders. The upper echelons of the gang world often rely on family ties with Pakistan when arranging the courier routes to bring the
drugs, nearly all heroin, back to Britain. The effort pays off quickly: A kilo of refined heroin bought in Pakistan costs £125,000 but is sold in Britain for twice that amount, before being cut and sold on the streets.

Gangs? At Bradford Police Station the problem of street crime and drug-dealing is considered ‘no worse than anywhere else’. ‘Nobody wants to admit it,’ says George Sheeran of Bradford University, ‘Who wants to be racist? Everyone in Bradford knows however that Asian gangs are a serious problem for the city. Inter-ethnic conflicts are often drug-related.’

Silence blankets the older Asian community. When the first immigrant generation arrived, hard work swallowed their rebelliousness against discrimination; their striving to make money in a foreign country to feed their families made them humble towards the host nation and made them ignore racism. Likewise, many of them refuse to face problems that arise today within their own communities. ‘It doesn’t set the pattern for the whole city. Yes, there are a few kids selling drugs. But that is to be expected,’ said Abdul Karim, 56, a Bradford shopkeeper. Meanwhile, hard drugs and a climate of fear have arrived in Britain’s Asian communities.

Some Asian drug gangs use violence and guns to carve out territories and defend their profits. Like their parents and grandparents, Asian drug-dealers started their businesses by supplying internal circles within their ethnic community. ‘If you ignore white people, then that’s a lot of money you’re missing out on. I’ve found the guaras (whites) to be good customers,’ a 26-year-old Bradford-born dealer of Pakistani origin says. ‘The business is booming,’ says another dealer working his patch on Lumb Lane, once notorious as a red-light area. Drugs culture is turf warfare: ‘You want that patch so you can make more money than anyone else – that’s why you get so much gang warfare.’

Calling the problem by its name does not automatically solve it. However, ignoring the facts, and denying assistance to those who break out, fuels criminal energies – often born out of frustration and a lack of recognition. The state cannot block the way into crime for Asian youths who feel left alone with the assumption of a bleak future. Yet it can open and create perspectives for them – e.g. by offering homework supervision, and guidance and information about training courses, job and higher education opportunities.

The state can provide help and assistance for those who want to step out of the drug world; and it can support services aimed at treating addicts or at educating a community about the dangers of drugs or gangs. Unfortunately, most information leaflets for drug addicts are published in English: more people would be reached if this kind of information were more easily accessible in south Asian languages too.

A dark poster covered with Urdu letters is pinned to a mosque in Manningham. Exiting the prayer house with his father, a young boy leans with one hand against the wall partly covering the large block letters of the poster while he ties his shoelaces. ‘It says if you witness a crime, you should report it to the police,’ he explains. Police in Bradford have started an integrated approach with the local Asian communities. The ‘Dob-in-a-dealer’ (‘Dob’ is street slang for ‘denounce’) programme was introduced in August 2002. Nine months later, Bradford police reported that more than 1,000 people had called the anonymous hotline with information.
Special programmes are supposed to establish trust, and in return gain support from the ethnic communities. The ‘Dob-in-a-dealer’ posters and information leaflets urging people to expose drug dealers are spread around the local mosques and community centres. ‘Drug-dealing takes place across all communities and hopefully this leaflet will give Urdu-speaking people the confidence to phone in with information,’ says Bradford Drugs Co-ordinator, Detective Sergeant Colin Stansbie.

The outsider in Kreuzberg

‘36 Boys’ is the name of Germany’s largest youth gang, their home base Berlin-Kreuzberg: ‘Every single one of us had been to prison’, remembers Hakan Durmus who himself spent a total of four years and six months behind bars. ‘Killa-Hakan’ was part of the core group of ‘36 Boys’ which consisted of a dozen kids of Turkish origin.

‘SO36’ is an old postal code which split Kreuzberg into the districts of South-West-61 and South-East-36. Those numbers are still used to distinguish two quite different areas. ‘36’ includes the drug scene around Kottbusser Tor whereas ‘61’ has the image of a better-off neighbourhood. Both areas have a dense Turkish population. ‘SO36’ is also the name of a nightclub, a famous meeting-place for the punk scene. Since the 1990s, Turkish gay nights are part of the regular programme. ‘36 Juniors’ was a short-lived attempt to organize a successor gang. Even girls followed gang structures – ‘36 Girls’.

The whole gang of ‘36 Boys’ consisted of up to 400 men. A so-called ‘protection troop’ was in control of the streets. The criminal activities of the gang followed an organizational pattern: one group was in charge of breaking into cars in the eastern district, another group concentrated on cars in the western district. The 1980s and early 1990s were the time of gangs and counter-gangs. They spread their names by ‘tagging’ a neighbourhood – i.e. spraying graffiti on the walls. Members of a gang were easily recognizable by their secret uniform: a jacket which often displayed the name of the gang, a hat or a bandage on their heads. Fights would always signify who was in control of the street or the district. The ‘36 Boys’ broke up in 1994.

Other Kreuzberg gangs were called ‘Black Panther’, ‘Fighters’, ‘Türkiye Boys’, ‘Alis’, ‘Simsekler’: The ‘Simseklers’ – which translates as ‘lightning’ – started off with eight or ten teenagers who played football together. The leader of the gang was also the leader of their football team. Between 1983 and 1985, the gang consisted of about 200–300 teenagers of Turkish-Arab origin. From the pitch, they went to discotheques, to shared rides on public transport – and eventually to crime.

Membership of a gang provides a model for identification. Hakan Durmus felt out of place in German society: ‘Our cultures did not fit together.’ During the day his parents were at work working double shifts. ‘At night they locked me into our house. They were so worried about me.’ When Durmus was 12, he was allowed on to the streets and made his first friends: ‘It was like a bomb exploding – I wanted to show everybody that I was not afraid of anybody.’
Durmus continued: ‘I spent more and more time on the streets thinking “We are in a foreign country, we have to stick together. We, the 36 Boys”.’ The leader of a gang serves as a role model for teenagers. Eventually and inevitably, however, the youngsters grow out of their ‘gang years’. ‘Some saved themselves by setting up a family. Some entered the employment market,’ says Durmus. Neco Celik and Erhan Emre, two former ‘36 Boys’, chose careers in film, founded the production company ‘36 pictures’ and turned into upwardly mobiles, as did Durmus. Their film ‘Alltag’ (‘Everyday life’) is based on their memories of growing up in Kreuzberg. The company name reflects a strong identification with the film-makers’ neighbourhood. ‘I saved my life with music,’ says Durmus, ‘I had already started writing lyrics in prison. But I had no clue I was a rapper then.’ In 1994, Durmus became a member of the Berlin-Kreuzberg HipHop group, ‘Islamic Force’, which was founded in 1987 – Turkish lyrics combined with ‘Gangsta-Rap’ earned them the title of pioneers in oriental HipHop.

Durmus comments: ‘It was a tough time. We had no clue what was going on: Do we go back to Turkey? Or do we stay here? That was a totally paranoid film.’ Many guest workers only gave up the prospect of returning to Turkey during the 1990s.

The question of whether one feels ‘Turkish’ or ‘German’ is out. A global perspective makes identification a question of lifestyle. Are you a yuppie? A breaker, a rapper, a sprayer? An intellectual or a Bohemian? The question of national identity has disappeared and yields a stronger individual identification with local roots: ‘I am a Berliner’; or even ‘I am a Kreuzberger’.

Within a certain scene, national differences do not play such a big role. The Turkish HipHop scene is closer to the German HipHop scene than to the tea drinkers at a Turkish café. A Turkish lawyer is closer to a German lawyer than to a vegetable-store owner – unless the store owner is his father.

‘Organized Turkish youth gangs are not our main problem any more,’ says Jörg Wuttig, head of the police unit responsible for Kottbusser Tor in Kreuzberg. This does not, of course, mean that problems and tensions within the Turkish community have all dissolved into HipHop music and business plans. ‘People of foreign origin,’ comments Wuttig on his own district in 2002, ‘were involved in 50% of all cases of serious physical injury in public, 40% in drug-related cases, street crime 45%. In total, 40.6% of our local crime is committed by people of foreign origin.’

The numbers are more or less public. Statistics list crimes committed by foreigners as opposed to Germans. Michael Knape, head of the Berlin Polizeidirektion 6 (East), spoke proudly when he presented a report about a successful police investigation into youth gang dealings in 2000 – 50 robberies in the course of two months, often immensely
violent, a majority of the gang members of Turkish origin. Had I said this a couple of years ago, I would probably have been accused of being politically right-wing.’

The long-time taboo was broken when Dieter Glietsch, head of the Berlin police, addressed the problem of foreign criminals publicly in 2000 – the first senior officer to do so. A spell was broken, numerous reports followed, focusing on the high concentration of crime within ethnic communities. The annual crime report, published by the police in 2002, concluded that almost every second juvenile delinquent in Berlin was of foreign origin (44.9%).

‘Ask anybody on the street, they will tell you that Turks are the largest groups of immigrants and the main problem in our society,’ says Marieluise Beck, federal government commissioner for foreigners and integration, ‘But that’s not true – Aussiedler from Russia make up a larger number, their average crime record tops that of Germany’s Turks.’ So why does the bad image persist? Beck’s view is that ‘The political class has agreed to welcome the re-settlers of German origin and is steering the general attitude and perception into acceptance.’ Immigration, on the other hand, is considered a more incalculable risk – how do we deal with cultural differences? How do we fight unemployment? How do we control the number of foreigners coming in? Will our social welfare networks collapse?

Official statistics often present a distorted picture, thus adding their share to the negative public image. How do we evaluate crime committed by foreigners? Migrants with German (or dual) citizenship usually count as ‘German citizens’ whereas the term ‘foreigner’ often includes those who came illegally – e.g. asylum seekers, labour migrants with foreign citizenship. The willingness to integrate and a sense of belonging are obviously stronger within the first group, whereas frustration, disorientation and unemployment are more common in the second. Contrasting ‘German’ and ‘foreign’ criminal behaviour thus distorts the picture.

Those who hold a work permit are less likely to work illegally. Those who earn money and recognition at their jobs are less likely to dropout. Those who carry a German (or British) or European passport are less likely to violate national citizenship rules – a notable difference between Russians of ethnic German origin and people of Turkish origin in Germany. Nevertheless, a closer look at the statistics shows that Turks do not top the list of foreign criminals in Germany. Why, then, does the image persist?

The fact that police have passed over control of certain areas to local inhabitants is one of the secrets shared openly in local pubs and tea houses while publicly denied by authorities. ‘Hermannstraße belongs to us,’ shout young children on the street around Neukölln’s Hermannplatz to local police units. ‘We look after ourselves,’ says a Turkish gang leader, ‘because nobody else does.’ Local police units face concerted solidarity during their raids. Ethnic clustering fosters the drug business, and a dealer can count on the support from his local Turkish or Arabic community.

Cutbacks in staff have created a situation in which patrolling is irregular – even in Berlin’s ‘Problemkieze’ (problem neighbourhoods). ‘We get less and less personnel while our tasks increase, and our budget is cut down. But in the end it is not only the police who are burdened,’ says Eberhard Schönberg of the German police union (GdP), ‘The citizens of our city are left behind. If we cannot help them, nobody can.’
How do we deal with young drop-outs of foreign origin who were born here but obviously do not feel they fit in? Berlin’s Interior Senator Eberhart Körting claims that those who have lived in Germany for only a few years, and during that time have mainly appeared as offenders, should be sent to their home country, as quickly as possible. Proposals of this kind – the social democratic senator is no exception – reflect three underlying assumptions. First, Turks do not belong here. Second, if the sons and daughters do not behave, they must go home. But where is ‘home’? Third, we do not want to deal with the issues behind deviant behaviour but to keep the effective number of offences low. ‘Many teenagers, foreigners as well as Germans, come from solid family backgrounds. They have decided to engage in criminal activities without any pressure. They should therefore be treated as criminals, not as victims,’ says Körting.

An unpublished police investigation into the ‘ghetto-ization’ and areas of ethnic conflict sounds depressingly dismissive: ‘Those areas are dominated by people who have decided not to respect the German laws.’
5 Identifying the roadblocks

A piece of paper

In the course of their careers all three social types – the upwardly mobile, the conformist and the outsider – have either overcome or submitted to certain recurring institutional barriers. Some of them they share, of course, with their German or British counterparts. Others mark certain differences in opportunities between the groups. We have filtered from our encounters with Turks and Pakistanis some of the main obstructive elements that emerged.

Banking and bureaucratic institutions are blocking the upwardly mobile, they are discouraging the conformists from expanding or taking up more ambitious projects, and they are creating an exclusive environment that leaves those who do not fit in frustrated and disorientated.

At 27 years old, Vural Öger had a clear sense of direction: ‘I need a plane, many planes. This will become a great business.’ Few people in the 1960s believed the young student of Turkish origin could be serious, much less successful with his idea. Öger, today the owner of one of Germany’s most successful tourist enterprises, rented an office – ‘30 square metres, 15 each room, a toilet, no kitchen, no bathroom’. He bought a typewriter and designed leaflets which he distributed in Turkish workers’ homes. ‘20,000 DM and you can charter a plane,’ a travel agent told him.

Öger’s chances of getting a bank loan resembled those of a 13-year-old asking for his Daddy’s Mercedes. Instead he asked his clients to pay: Turkish guest workers who wanted to visit their families in Turkey, who fancied a direct flight from Hamburg to Istanbul, and who would they trust but a travel agent who spoke their language? Within three days all tickets were sold: ‘The first flight went on 20 July 1969, the day Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon.’ Did he manage a giant leap for Turkish entrepreneurship?

Ayfer Durur – a ‘Meisterbrief’ (master craftsman certificate), work experience with Vidal Sassoon and Toni & Guy in New York, fluent in English, Turkish and German – was not crying for the moon when she meandered through the labyrinth of German bureaucracy searching for start-up capital: ‘People at the bank looked at me briefly; they thought “hair dresser, single, female, Turkish”. What they said was “Hair-dressers run too high a risk of going bankrupt.”’ Ayfer was close to giving up her dream: ‘There was only one option left,’ she says, ‘I had to ask my family for support.’ The Durur parents gave their daughter all their savings – perhaps remembering similar cases in the old days when the first generation immigrants set up businesses on the basis of family savings. They abandoned their dream of buying a house in Anatolia for their retirement years. Today, 38-year-old Ayfer not only runs a successful hair-salon in fashionable Berlin-Mitte. With four (German) employees in her team, she is helping the German labour market.
For orthodox Muslims, the western banking system marks an additional problem. Strict interpretations of Islam denounce the method of taking on a bank loan – to purchase a house or for start-up capital – because it involves the payment of interest.

Slowly western banks have discovered a neglected clientele and are adapting their services. The HSBC became Britain’s first high-street bank to offer mortgages and current accounts designed to comply with Islamic law.

‘Women in the subcontinent have a historic ‘banking collective’ known as BEESI or CAMMITY. This tradition has been transported to the diaspora and is used to finance a host of commitments from weddings to businesses. A group of individuals agree to contribute a fixed sum of money on a weekly or a monthly basis for a specified time. Each person draws an equal share during the life of the venture. This way of gaining control over their financial lives has proved invaluable in the history of women’s co-operatives in the subcontinent.’

*A Glimpse Through Purdah: Asian Women the Myth and the Reality,*
Sitara Khan, Trentham Books, 1999

Does the German population acknowledge the social and economic achievements of the Turkish-German immigrants and the developments in the second and third generation Turkish lifestyle? Remains of the old image, the Turks as the eternal Gastarbeiter, still exist. The Turkish vegetable-store owner has apparently become part of German society. But what if he steps out of his shop? What happens when Germany’s Turks claim their right to equal opportunities on the educational market, in politics, in business, in media?

We pinpointed two other obstructive elements which play an essential role in the lives of young Turkish and young Pakistani people – education (the key to the labour market) and housing (ghetto-ization).

‘I did not understand a word my teacher said,’ says Feridun Zaimoglu who came to Germany as a six-year-old, ‘I liked her, that’s why I was keen to learn.’ Unfortunately, few teachers seem to have the same effect on Turkish children. At a typical Kreuzberg nursery school, 60%–70% of the children are of Turkish origin. They feel no incentive to force themselves into learning the German language. For Zaimoglu, a Turkish guest worker’s child, the German language created a career: as a writer, the 40-year-old introduced ‘Kanak Sprak’, a Turkish-German street slang, into the cultural mainstream. Kanak Attak is his answer to three generations of Turkish immigration into Germany – the rise of a young Turkish-German identity. [Kanak Attak is the title of a film based on the book called Kanak Sprak.] Several books, films and TV shows took up the theme.

Zaimoglu’s message is clear: you play in the ‘league of the doomed’ if you waste your energy on fighting clichés. ‘You get stuck if you only fight off the tradition of your fathers and grandfathers, your mothers and grandmothers,’ he tells the younger generation. ‘Stop whining! Re-invent yourself! Emancipate yourself and learn German!’

Zaimoglu – who originally took up studies in medicine and arts which made him into ‘an educated Kanakster’ (a streetwise Turkish German) – serves as a role model because he presents a way of integrating his Turkish-ness into a career in Germany. He neither matches the idea of the ‘model Turk’ – a decent or ambitious Turk grateful to his German host country – nor does he ignore his roots: ‘You cannot wipe that out of your mug.’
Zaimoglu addresses a generation of young Turkish Germans who feel alienated from their parental heritage but who cannot find their own alternative track.

Turks in Germany – as well as Pakistanis in Britain – are less likely to get into on-the-job training than their German, or British, counterparts. Turkish businesses are less likely than German businesses to be granted permission to offer job training by the Chamber of Commerce. Approximately 5,000 Turkish businesses are in Berlin, but no numbers exist of how many offer job training. ‘Most certainly far less than German businesses,’ says Jan Eder of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce.

Business founders with EU-citizenship are facing the same rules in Germany as national citizens. Non-EU-citizens, however, often have their passports stamped ‘Gewerbe-Ausübung nicht gestattet’ (commercial activities not allowed). In order to enter self-employment, non-EU-citizens – people of Turkish origin with Turkish passports – must apply for official exemption.

‘It took four years before I finally received a training licence,’ says Diyap Sakalli. Sixteen years in the business – the German authorities eventually gave into the efforts of the 42-year-old owner of a printing company. ‘I can’t leave those kids behind on the street,’ Diyap said.

The procedures for obtaining a training licence made many business owners less persistent than Sakalli shy away. Formal requirements are a blocking factor, communication problems mark another barrier. Few native German speakers are able to fill out an application form without professional guidance.

The Meisterbrief (master craftsman certificate), the formal requirement to set up a craftsman business in Germany, poses another barrier to Turkish self-employment. Few Turkish immigrants hold certificates from their home countries. Re-training in Germany is expensive, time-consuming and, in some cases, even ethically impossible – a certified German butcher is supposed to slaughter a pig during his training period; any orthodox Muslim would rather slaughter his career.

Those who acquired their profession abroad but never received a certificate – or do not meet the German requirements – tend to open a kebab store or carry out their professions illegally. There is a tradition of hiring a ‘Meister’ as a ‘Strohmann’, a front-man on a 20-hour basis in order to set up a business legally. The German government is taking hesitant steps to eliminate the hindrances. In 65 out of 94 professions, the obligatory Meisterbrief might become redundant. The Ausbildereignungsverordnung (AEVO) (rules on how to train employees) was temporarily suspended: On a trial basis, German and foreign business owners can offer job training without taking the 90-hour seminar.

The reforms are based on the assumption that the job situation for young Turks will change if Turkish businesses take up the young Turkish unemployed, apparently unwanted by German businesses. Turks for Turks and Germans for Germans? ‘This will never work,’ says Heidi Gellhardt of Arbeit & Bildung e.V. in Berlin which offers advice to teenagers with migrant backgrounds. And, even if it went along those lines, Turkish businesses are often very small, too small to offer job training. ‘A business usually offers job training if things are going well,’ Heidi tells us, ‘Most migrant businesses suffer, however, more than the average German business, from the current recession.’
Esmahan Aykol’s application for a Berlin university programme for foreign law graduates was turned down: ‘They did not accept my Turkish law diploma,’ says the 33-year-old Turk. Born and raised in western Turkey, she first worked as a lawyer in Istanbul for some years after finishing university, and then chose a career as a journalist, reporting from Turkey and Iraq. Eventually she opened a bar on the Bosphorus where she served Turkish coffee to a German newspaper correspondent who later became her husband. In 1999, they moved together to Berlin.

In 2004, five years later, Aykol drinks coffee in the German capital and talks about a German movie director who was killed in an Istanbul bathtub – the protagonist of her first novel (a bestseller in Turkey) which was later translated into German under the title Hotel Bosporus.

‘People in Berlin of German origin and those of Turkish origin have a problematic relationship,’ the writer says, ‘to be more precise, they hardly have a relationship’. Most Germans do not have Turkish friends, most German Turks have no German friends. Aykol is happy to be an exception to the rule – she has German and Turkish friends in Berlin. Eventually she even managed to get into the university programme and is now working on her doctoral thesis at Berlin’s Humboldt University.

A piece of cloth

German customers are less likely to buy perfume if the shop assistant wears a headscarf; at least this was the opinion of a department store manager in a small town in Hesse. In May 1999, Fadime C., a long-term employee and former trainee at the store, informed her boss that she would be wearing a headscarf when returning to work after maternity leave. She explained her different lifestyle to her boss due to changes in her Islamic beliefs. Public appearance without a headscarf was no longer appropriate for the young Muslim woman. The manager objected. Fadime C. was formally dismissed by the end of October.

As long as a large majority of Turkish women either stayed at home with their families or took low-paid jobs – common within the Turkish community – the question of whether a Muslim shop assistant should be allowed to wear a headscarf seemed irrelevant. First-generation Turkish immigrants lacked the qualifications for jobs that require an academic degree. The question of whether a Muslim teacher should be allowed to teach German pupils the binomial formulas wearing a headscarf was therefore not discussed.

Fereshda Ludin, a German Muslim of Afghan origin, initiated the so-called ‘Kopftuchstreit’ (headscarf-controversy): The young teacher wanted to enter the civil service as a teacher at a German state school. She insisted on wearing a headscarf. But the state of Baden-Württemberg insisted on banning all religious symbols from state schools.

The case ended up at the Federal Constitutional Court which passed the decision back to the states – i.e. the ministers of education in each state should formulate their individual policies on the subject. Fereshda Ludin won her case in Karlsruhe: excluding a teacher from school service merely because she is wearing a headscarf does not have a basis in the national law. But Ludin will still not be able to enter school service unless she adheres to
the western dress code. The state of Baden-Württemberg decided – in accordance with the Karlsruhe verdict – that teachers will not be allowed to wear headscarves at school.

‘We need more teaching staff with a migrant background’, Klaus Böger, Senator for Education in Berlin, said in a speech in 2002. Educational standards were to be improved, and all pupils should be given equal opportunities.

Birsel Göktas, who graduated with her first state exam in 2002, would fit the bill perfectly. If schools had to apply for their staff – instead of teacher candidates sending their application forms to schools – her desk would be flooded with letters. A 30-year-old maths teacher, fluent in German and Turkish, should be in high demand on the education market. Yet the enthusiastic teacher-to-be – with excellent grades – is forced to sit at home. Why?

In order to complete teacher training in Germany, students must spend two years as trainee teachers at a school (soon this might be reduced to six months; Bachelor and Master degrees will be introduced in autumn 2004). Each federal state distributes the posts following a standard procedure. The training concludes with a second state exam. Many aspiring teachers consider the waiting-list procedure as a sting in the tail of their degree course. In November 2003, about 1,000 candidates were waiting to receive one out of only 550 available traineeship positions in the city of Berlin. Every year, teacher candidates far outnumber the vacant positions on offer. A logjam results: those candidates who do not get assigned to a school for a traineeship immediately end up on the list for the following year. For Birsel Göktas the procedure appears to be like the eye of a needle. As a non-German and, additionally, a non-EU-citizen, she needs to slip into a 3% contingent of the total number of vacant positions. That is the percentage reserved for and distributed to non-EU foreigners.

A special regulation could help and seems to us to be a good solution: During the coming EU-negotiations with Turkey some provisions should be made to give Turkish citizens equal access to civil service jobs as EU-citizens.

Birsel Göktas did not speak a word of German when she first arrived in Germany in 1990. After passing a language test in 1992, she registered at Berlin’s Technical University: ‘I wanted to belong and talk to people.’ As a teacher, Göktas could serve as an encouraging role model for many Turkish children. For the time being she is only an example of how theoretical concepts of integration are blocked in practice.

The Berlin Senate started to take Turkish citizens into teaching employment in 1971. The fact that Birsel Göktas’ subject (mathematics) is more strongly in demand than overstuffed subjects such as geography and literature does not make it any easier for the young Turkish woman. In practice, any German geography teacher is far more likely to be given a place than she is.

The Aziz-Nesin Europe School in Berlin-Kreuzberg wanted the young bilingual teacher who had completed an internship at the school during her studies. But the decision is with the federal education office (Landesschulamt). Individual requests are not accepted. Politicians call for teachers with immigrant backgrounds in Germany. But the system blocks Turkish talents entering the teaching profession. As Birsel comments ruefully, ‘Everybody applauds my enthusiasm – but nobody helps.’
Omar Khan recently bought a new house: ‘It’s huge because I have many friends.’ Bradford’s most famous curry chef places a pack of cigarettes on a table in the entrance hall of his popular restaurant. ‘Of course it’s in Manningham.’ He makes it sound as if any other decision would have been treason.

Inside the quiet, dimly lit dining-room, all tables are taken, waiters in elegant uniforms serve Khan’s own creation of Chicken Tikka Masala – ‘the British want it medium-hot’. Prices are above those of the average Asian restaurant in Bradford, certainly above the average budget of a university ward resident in a predominantly Asian community. Rice plates are served between conversations about developments in the social market economy and medieval literature – the most frequent guests come from Bradford University which is only a few blocks away.

George Sheeran is a regular guest at Khan’s and an expert on Bradford’s housing history – his book, Good Houses Built of Stone, explores local architectural developments in Leeds and Bradford from 1600–1800. ‘I always recommend Khan’s to our guest lecturers and to new staff,’ he says. However his recommendation is to be taken with another morsel of advice: ‘Don’t walk here by yourself at night.’ Sheeran, whom we meet for a morning stroll through the area, commutes daily from Shipley to his office at Bradford University. ‘This is not the best area,’ he adds.

We pass terraced houses, most of which have obviously not seen a professional builder for some decades. ‘What you see are the remains of middle-class houses from the 19th century,’ explains Sheeran. The design of some houses was affected by the clothing industry, producing at times distinctive plans and elevations. ‘The main demands on space in the clothiers’ houses were a room in which to work, and a place to store raw materials and wares. Some clothiers were dryers as well as weavers, and room for the dye lead or vat had to be found.’

In the 1960s, the same houses provided homes for a large number of the arriving Pakistani mill workers. Housing in the inner-city area was among the cheapest, and the size of the houses allowed for low-cost flat-shares. In fact, according to the 1991 census, two-thirds of Bradford’s total population of Asian origin settled in four wards of the inner-city area – University, Bradford Moor, Toller and Little Horton. Initially the decision of only a few immigrant workers, new arrivals from the same home country who went along and settled close to relatives and friends, created a micro-pattern which is still apparent today. The Pakistani population is heavily concentrated in a number of inner-city wards, with two wards having over 50% of their population of Pakistani background, and one being over 70% ‘Pakistani’.

The situation is similar in Berlin – ‘Little Istanbul’, as Kreuzberg is nicknamed, provided comfort zones for new arrivals who spoke little German. A stroll through the local Turkish tea houses is like letting your fingers travel across a map of Turkey – men from one Anatolian village (usually 50+) gather at one place, men from another village at another. Kreuzberg, Neukölln, Wedding and Schöneberg have by far the highest concentration of people of Turkish origin.
Owner occupancy – though throughout the years less common among the British-Pakistani population (60%) than among white people (71%) or people from India (81%) – was the ambition of most Pakistani immigrants. ‘Signing the sales contract for our house was as hard as giving birth,’ says Tasleem Siddique. In most cases it was, in fact, a very family-related operation. Traditional housing-finance lending institutions, such as building societies and banks, would often be discriminatory in their practices – special policies excluded loans on certain types of properties and houses in certain inner-city areas, areas with a dense immigrant population. An investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) revealed that mortgage lenders operated an informal policy of not granting loans to black people on houses in areas deemed too good for them to inhabit – prospective house owners would rely on family and social networks to provide generous interest-free loans.

The so-called clustering provides social support and comfort for people of ethnic minority origin. ‘You don’t want to be the only Asian family living on the block,’ says Razena Bibi, a 20-year-old Bradfordian of Pakistani origin, ‘In Manningham you feel safe, comfortable. You are with your own kind. I would never want to move away.’ Any ambitions to leave Bradford? Razena shrugs her shoulders, ‘Australia would be nice.’ She mentions Neighbours, an Australian TV series she likes to watch, ‘At least they speak our language.’ Her eyes wander across a computer screen at the Manningham community centre, scanning the local university programmes. Somehow, Australia seems closer for her than Shipley or Leeds.

‘My friends do not understand how I can go here every day for work,’ says Amanda Jackson. She works as an adviser at ‘jobs@manningham’, a government initiative which was set up after the riots. ‘We try to provide orientation for young people, we show them how to write a CV, we provide space for them to do their homework if they can’t find quietness at home.’ The high unemployment figures in their neighbourhoods weigh on the shoulders of many young British Pakistanis. ‘We want to encourage them and show them ways into the labour market,’ says Jackson, ‘Young girls are often forced to stay at home and work in the household. Anything outside of Manningham district seems to be beyond all question. It once took us 18 months to successfully convince the father of a young Pakistani girl who wanted to get a job that this is not a dangerous thing for her to do.’

‘We come from completely different cultural backgrounds,’ says Jackson. In her daily work, she has stumbled over ‘so many things that are going wrong here’. Though familiar and usually comfortable in their own neighbourhoods, many British Asians feel excluded from those better off. Whites get the better jobs, live in fancier neighbourhoods, their parents speak English and are socially better off. In Manningham, many houses are visibly run-down, unemployment is perceptibly high. ‘Whites come here to buy their stuff and leave,’ says Sarfraz, a young British-Pakistani ‘runner’ aspiring to rise to the advanced posting of a ‘street dealer’. Does the government care? ‘No wonder those kids get frustrated,’ Jackson concludes.

Until the riots, the Bradford-born white woman had never set foot in a local Asian neighbourhood. For decades, the white community and the Asian community lived ‘parallel lives’. Nazum Latif’s parents came in the 1960s from Pakistan to Bradford where he works as an assistant adviser at jobs@manningham. He knows the clichés: ‘Many white people think it’s all gangs and stuff in Manningham, that you can’t walk down the street without getting a fist in your face, a typical no-go area.’
Public perception does not match the actual immigrant crime rate in either Bradford or Berlin. Günter Piening, Foreigners’ Commissioner of the Berlin Senate, says the fear of harassment in certain areas is often much stronger than the likelihood of falling victim to a crime. Police statistics show that the percentage of foreign crime has decreased since 1997.

Kreuzberg’s tragedy is that it is sliding deeper into poverty at precisely the moment when a Turkish middle class is beginning to emerge. Some are escaping the ‘ghetto’ – as they themselves call it – but most are left struggling to uphold conservative values that could be held by either Turks or Germans. We come across a Turkish mother, in a headscarf, in her 30s, who is forbidding her children to play on the street – once the most normal of sights in Kreuzberg. ‘They might stumble across a heroin syringe,’ she explains, ‘It’s a shame that so many Germans have moved away.’
6 Toward an open society

We made, in the spirit of J.B. Priestley, two journeys: an English and a German one. Despite the obvious differences between Bradford and Berlin, we were struck again and again by the echoes in the immigrant experience. There was the neighbourhood competition – the Pakistanis with Indians and Bangladeshis, the Turks pitted against Russians of ethnic German origin or with Bosnians. There was the intricate connection with the motherland and the growing estrangement of the younger generation. There was also the unemployment of the younger generation. The unemployment culture in both cities allowed the jobless to muddle along for years within the safety of their ‘comfort zones’ (a multicultural euphemism for ‘ghettos’). The attitude toward the neighbourhood was ambiguous (a source of protection – or a social handicap?) as was the relationship to the state. There was a common distrust of the police and bureaucracy, a cautious but growing confidence in the schooling system, an uneasiness about the health service and the treatment of family illness. Many Turks and many Pakistanis felt relatively comfortable and, at the same time, relatively deprived. One unpublished medical study we came across showed that people in the wealthy Berlin district of Zehlendorf lived on average seven years longer than those in Kreuzberg. This was more than the routine equation of health with wealth – Turks felt safe in Kreuzberg yet were aware that they were not living in the best of all possible worlds. In both Manningham and Kreuzberg there was, we found, a sense of having been cheated or let down by the state. We met happy, settled individuals – an Anatolian tailor, a retired Pakistani bus conductor giving driving lessons – but they were exceptional. Even those who were making the system work in their favour appeared restless, and, in ways that they themselves could not identify, dissatisfied.

Saskia Sassen, in a bright survey entitled Guests and Aliens, suggests that, if we thought of immigrants and long-stay refugees as settlers, they would no longer pose such a volatile political problem:

‘We have historically attached positive connotations to the settler for the hard and dirty work of settling the Western world’s frontiers all around the globe. Are low-paying hard and dangerous jobs that immigrants still disproportionately hold today’s frontier in the midst of our societies?’

De-industrializing cities in advanced economies really are creating frontier zones. Whether immigrants are content to be frontier-men and women is another question; but the term ‘settler’ does at least allow the host society to recognize the value of new blood and to accept the positive dynamism of ethnic communities. The idea of immigrant settler is easier to acknowledge in Britain than in Germany because of the citizenship rules. At an early stage of our research we visited a Turkish hairdresser in Berlin to talk about how life had changed for Turks since the September 11 attacks. She had little to say about the subject because she was enraged about the case of ‘Mehmet’ (as he was publicly called for data protection reasons) which seemed to have a much more direct bearing on the lives of Kreuzberg Turks. Mehmet was a wild 14-year-old child of Gastarbeiter who had broken into dozens of cars. He was a classic juvenile delinquent. The German court ruled that, since he could not be jailed (he was too young) and his family were no longer capable of controlling him, he should be sent back to Turkey, more precisely ‘home’ to
Turkey. ‘But this is our home,’ said the parents, and the full precariousness of ‘guest worker’ status became clear to Germany’s over 2 million Turks. The notion that British Pakistanis could be expelled if they do not behave would be profoundly offensive, in fact illegal, in Britain. Even the far-right graffiti ‘Paki go home’ has disappeared from the walls of Bradford.

In 2003, a British football fan was convicted of a criminal offence. During a league match, the 21-year-old had joined a chant containing the word ‘Paki’ which was aimed at Oldham Athletic supporters. Racist chanting at a football match was, for the first time, classified as a criminal offence. ‘It is odd and a shame that this is so in this country, but the unpleasant context in which it is so often used has left it with a derogatory or insulting racist connotation,’ the judge said. That protection is missing for the Turks in Kreuzberg.

As we argued in Chapter 3, citizenship is no longer the magic formula for ethnic communities. It can admittedly ease the stark alternatives and raw emotions of the Mehmet case. But we have to find new ways of expressing belonging. Indeed, citizenship can muddy the issues. The feelings of disadvantage and discrimination experienced by young Pakistanis in Manningham are intensified by the colour of their passport – they are British, have equal rights and can vote, yet they are manifestly worse off than white Britons. They thus blame the state for thwarting their ambitions. Café conversations with young Pakistanis often end up with some conspiracy theory about racist bureaucrats or politicians.

There is Turkish anger too but it takes a different form. The Turks are largely excluded from the German political process by the restrictive nationality laws (even the amended, more liberal legislation on double citizenship), but for that very reason they have to be given a degree of protection. Since no party speaks for them (except occasionally the Greens) and since only naturalized German Turks can vote, other forms of expression have to be found to anchor them into society. As a result, more energy is being applied into thinking about Turkish than about Pakistani problems. From the interweaving of foreigners’ plenipotentiaries (Ausländerbeauftragte), foreigner advisory councils and other state-sponsored go-betweens, and out of this earnest, well-meaning multicultural confusion, there has emerged a special, almost privileged, standing for the Turkish community. The German authorities have to make a strong or at least highly visible effort to protect Kreuzberg Turks; that is the paradoxical price of excluding them from citizenship. If a German passport does not open the way into the labour market, then it has only marginal value for the average Kreuzberg Turk. What is needed is a formally acknowledged halfway status, sometimes known as ‘denizenship’. This would give the Turks full employment, residential and social rights, but not participation in national elections or access to public office. Ten or twenty years ago Kreuzberg Turks would have been indignant at such a proposal because it smacks of second-class citizenship. Now they seem to be more relaxed about a solution that allows them to dodge difficult questions about identity and loyalty. Few opinion polls have been conducted among Kreuzberg Turks but our many interviews point in this direction: older Turks do not want to lose inheritance rights in the motherland, younger Turks have no enthusiasm to serve in either the German or the Turkish army. The status of non-citizen is not as forbidding or as dismissive as it seems.

This is at least a partial answer to the nagging question as to why young Pakistanis rioted in Bradford while young Turks have never revolted in Berlin. Denizenship, the half-way house, is a way of recognizing that the guest workers are no longer guests but settlers. The older generation was integrated into Germany only through the workplace. With the arrival of families, of second and third generations, the social anchoring moved into
institutions like schools, housing and neighbourhood associations. The communal level is the place where Berlin and Bradford can learn most from each other. This goes beyond grand questions of national identity or the ideology of multiculturalism. It rests on simple self-interest and we believe that will end up as the best engine of effective integration.

An openly Islamic lifestyle poses a challenge to German communities. According to a study on ‘Islamic daily life in Germany’ by the SPD-aligned Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Muslims in Germany feel uneasy about practising their religion. Germans, on the other hand, are suspicious of activities by religious groups. The building of mosques, slaughtering according to Islamic rites and Islamic burials cause conflict in many communities. Problems arise about fasting at work, headscarves in public service and spiritual guidance at hospitals and in prisons. The situation is more pronounced in Berlin where even Christian worship and ritual is significantly weaker than in Munich or Cologne.

Germans in Berlin frequently believe that the presence of Turks in the schoolroom is lowering educational standards. Shifting schools is complicated under the German system and the private educational sector is under-developed. The consequence is that in many schools, especially in Kreuzberg, German parents are either openly hostile to Turkish parents or forced into some kind of co-operative approach.

How do we improve Turkish children’s language skills so that the class can move ahead with the syllabus? The co-operative approach is winning out. The fact that it is based on a false premise – a preponderance of Turkish children in a class is not actually the main element in educational slippage – is irrelevant. Germans and Turks are recognizing common problems and talking about them. The state has an important role, especially as it is insisting on language tests for all citizens.

Hesse had a good idea: in a new project called ‘Frühstart’, the first of its kind in Germany, immigrant kindergarten children will receive an ‘early start’ at integrating into Germany with German lessons and intercultural education. Kindergarten teachers will receive additional training in both language teaching and intercultural education. But the project is based largely on private funding, nearly €500,000. We should be considering ways of joint state-and-private funding to guarantee educational continuity.

The catalyst for an improved relationship between Turks and Germans, and between Pakistanis and their white British neighbours, is an enhanced image for the ethnic communities. That is what makes Saskia Sassen’s ‘settler’ proposal so helpful; it moves the focus away from minorities being a burden or a parasitical presence, to a positive and energetic pillar of society. Our argument on assimilating or integrating minorities has been that encouraging individual enterprise should take precedence over state interference. However, some state activism is unavoidable and no more so than in the shaping of image. We found a remarkable degree of ignorance among white neighbours in Manningham and Kreuzberg; there was reluctance to ask questions about Islamic institutions, activities in mosques or other apparently closed religious circles. It is up to the national and local media to make these walls porous.

The BBC and its competitors have made a start: they reflect ethnic diversity in a way unthinkable 10 years ago. The Cultural Diversity Network, set up by public and commercial television stations, has pushed for ethnic minority targets. British Asians now figure in all the major soap operas, in crime series (though rather as criminals) and as newscasters and on-screen reporters. We are a little suspicious of recruitment quotas and
plans and Cool Britannia-style marketing of ethnic diversity. Yet the system is more effective than the haphazard promotion of Turks on German television. There is only one newscaster of Turkish origin on a minor TV channel, no on-screen Turkish reporters, no sports commentators, no women’s editors, no talk-show hosts or analysts. Only three nichés present themselves: music and youth programmes, comedy and cinema. Even for these small segments of the electronic media, public acceptance is brittle. The Hamburg-Turkish director, Fatih Akin, won the Berlin Film Festival 2004 with *Head-On (Gegen die Wand)* featuring a young Turkish woman in Germany breaking away from her conservative family and marrying a Turkish alcoholic. The film was hailed by German critics as a triumph of German film-making. But the tabloid press, evidently unhappy at a Turkish success, then proceeded to dismantle the star, actress Sibel Kekilli, who had previously worked in pornographic films. For four successive days *Bild* newspapers condemned Kekilli, informed her shocked parents, found supporters for her and then lost interest. Naturally each article was accompanied by an explicit photograph from her porno-past. And naturally it has complicated her function as a role model for other young Turkish women. Akin himself gets furious when, as frequently happens, his films are reduced to the *Gastarbeiter*-subject: ‘The term ‘guest worker’ does not exist in my vocabulary any more.’

There is certainly scope within the German television system to promote the careers of German Turks. The whole state network (ARD, ZDF) is built up on quotas and political balances between the regions. Frequently the party card of a reporter determines whether he or she will be sent to a key foreign posting. But the idea of applying the quota mentality to ethnic minorities is ruled out by directors: ‘It would have the opposite effect – German viewers would resent the favouring of foreign-looking reporters and become even more anti-foreigner,’ one senior television journalist told us. We disagree. Role models are essential; they may be artificial constructs but every developed society with an immigrant community accepts the need for socially mobile heroes and heroines.

**Role models**

Shazia Mirza, British-Pakistani comedian – ‘I am an orthodox Pakistani with western traits’ – fights social taboos on stage: ‘My name is Shazia Mirza, at least that’s what it says on my pilot’s licence.’ – Funny? – ‘There is no better sign of integration than having the ability to laugh at each other and our perceived differences,’ the 28-year-old Birmingham-born former school teacher says.

Vural Öger, 61, owner of Öger-Tours – ‘I have a huge Turkish heart but I am part of this society’ – is the model of a Turkish-German business success story. An election campaigner for Germany’s Social Democrats and a member of the immigration commission in 2000, his policy is based on integration and encourages Turkish citizens to engage on social, political and economic levels. ‘This ghetto-ization is terrible. It is dangerous for both sides if immigrants distance themselves from German society.’

Feridun Zaimoglu, 40, Turkish-German writer who introduced the Turkish-German street slang *Kanak Sprak* into mainstream culture – ‘I am an educated Kanakster’ – sees language as the key to integration. ‘Don’t give up your roots,’ he tells Turkish teenagers. ‘And don’t miss out learning German.’ The son of Turkish guest-worker parents came to Germany at the age of six.
The media is important too for the self-image of ethnic communities. How do we see ourselves? What binds us? We have already discussed the fissions in ethnic communities, the break between generations, the social atomisation that is boosting the importance of the mosques and the imams in both Manningham and Kreuzberg. Own-language media, and above all the radio, can help transcend these divisions. In Kreuzberg, the Turkish language radio ‘Metropol FM’, the multilingual ‘Radio Multi-Kulti’ and music channels all address the Turkish-German families. Turkish television is also available but does not make the same impact as media geared to the local community. Manningham households meanwhile tune in to the (English, Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati and Bengali) programming of Bradford’s ‘Sunrise Radio’. The Bradford Asian magazine market seems to be much more developed than Kreuzberg’s.

Our understanding of the ethnic media scene however is that radio is the most significant integrative tool because it reaches women with children. Mothers are the route to a better-adjusted community. Children have always functioned as interpreters for immigrant communities; language competence gained in school quickly surpasses that of their parents. We met a 13-year-old Turkish girl trying to explain a tax form to her father. Developing the normal connection between mother and child is the best way of ending the self-segregation of ethnic minority families. The key is language and mobility. Here, it seems to us, Kreuzberg has the edge on Manningham. Daytime language teaching for young Turkish mothers in Kreuzberg is often accompanied by childcare within the building. The programming of the Volkshochschule (adult education centre) is structured intelligently around the needs and tight time constraints of working mothers – a complex matter in a society where schools often close at one or two o’clock in the afternoon.

Semra – a 23-year-old Turkish mother who was trapped into an arranged marriage at the age of 17 – works at a Kreuzberg café while her two children, three- and five-years-old, go to a local Kindergarten. ‘I was too young, I did not know what to do,’ she says about her marriage which ended with a divorce about a year ago. The German system of so-called second-chance education – originally developed at grammar schools (Gymnasien), Volkshochschulen and various educational institutions for former soldiers returning after the war who were robbed of their chances to finish their school degrees – steered her life in a new direction. ‘In two years’ time I will have my Fachabitur (vocational baccalaureat diploma),’ says Semra serving Latte Macchiato to two girls who are highlighter-reading a stack of photocopies, ‘And, who knows, I might even go to university – just as most of my colleagues do.’

Driving schools offer Turkish language instruction for women; some of them also offer childcare. In Manningham we found driving schools with Urdu instruction. But the more conservative religious climate there almost certainly constrains the would-be female motorist – she would need to be taught by a female instructor because for many Manningham Pakistanis it is unthinkable for a married woman to be confined in a physically closed space with a male stranger. We could not find reliable statistics but our visual impression is that more Muslim women drive cars in Kreuzberg than in Manningham. Most in any case use public transport (which for important connections is better in Berlin than in Bradford).

The parent-teacher association is becoming a crucial bridging organization between the ethnic communities and the host societies. ‘They don’t really work,’ says a teacher at a Kreuzberg school, ‘The Germans gather in one corner, the Turks in another, each with their own interests.’ We heard a similar account from Manningham. Yet it seems to us
that schools in both Bradford and Berlin could be encouraged to employ Urdu and Turkish speakers to provide a single contact between school and parents. It is a simple enough task for this person to ring immigrant mothers, find out their concerns and encourage them to attend school meetings. The aim has to be to create a level of shared engagement allowing, for example, Turkish and German parents to agree on the need for a jumble sale to raise money to buy books for the school library.

These are micro-issues, yet they focus on the central problem of building inter-communal trust. There is no sensible way in which the authorities can break up ethnic concentrations in Bradford or Berlin. Ghettos, in a democratic society, exist out of choice. Sometimes rent levels or property prices confine the immigrants; sometimes there are attempts to obstruct moves to wealthier districts. However, any state-induced measure to disperse the population is doomed: bussing children to out-of-district schools solves nothing and creates new tensions. The key is to convince people that the city cares about their district and about their futures. That means targeted investment, above all demonstrating confidence in the younger generation of immigrants. Imaginative playgrounds and freshly painted Kindergartens are a small, obvious step. Manningham and Kreuzberg are lacking in both; the blame is put on stretched communal budgets. Police too can play their part. Co-operation with representatives of mosques, local social workers or Turkish community representatives can help build up trust. The state should also foster immigrant networking – the Turkish Yellow Pages have been a success in Berlin and could lead to other projects in which Turks share information and experience with each other.

Cross-over concepts break down barriers

British-Asian restaurant owners have successfully adapted their menus to the British palate. Chicken Tikka Masala is served as a more gentle version of medium-hot.

German-Turkish kebab is wrapped in bread, with added salad and sauce – ready for take-away, the most effective competition to McDonald’s.

Emel Algan has created a different cross-over pattern: the 43-year-old Turkish mother of six children and head of an Islamic women’s association in Berlin, designs hats that cover hair, ears and throat – fashionable alternatives to the Muslim headscarf, now worn by fashionable non-Muslims.

Germany can learn from Britain how to deregulate society in a manner that encourages upward and outward mobility. Ayfer Durur commented, ‘You cannot set up a hair-salon without a Meisterbrief. Of course you can rent a property but you will never get council permission to use it as a salon.’ As it happens, Ayfer has her Meisterbrief – the diploma which shows that you have put in several years of apprenticeship and passed often very strict exams. She continues:

‘Lots of Turks don’t get as far as Meister, not because their skills are poor but because they make too many mistakes in their written language. In England it’s different – the bank asks you how many regular customers you have from your old salon. If you have regulars then obviously you have their trust. They wouldn’t keep on coming if you burned their scalps or couldn’t talk to them.’
British educational reformers admire Germany’s pattern of structured apprenticeship, its careful protection of crafts. In a fast-moving urban society however, the need to pass through the hoops of the dual educational system is gumming up the service economy – and discriminating against Turks by setting written language requirements too high. We would urge a more differentiated, less bureaucratically clogged approach to setting up small businesses. The *Meisterbrief* could be extended to include Muslim traditions – a butcher, for example, could be trained according to the idea of ‘*halal*’; confectioners should be allowed to specialise in Turkish delicacies. Each trade council should have culturally sensitive contact people.

This will benefit not only Turks but the whole of German society. Every Turkish shopkeeper needs a ‘*Gewerbeschein*’, an official trading permit. European Union nationals receive this permit almost automatically; Turks do not. That stirs resentment, a suspicion that the issuing authorities favour the German competition.

As Germany modernises, so it can remove some of the bureaucratic stockades surrounding the Turks. It does not need to look far for a model: Bradford has shown its flexibility in many business sectors. Nor does it need to search for justification. The Berlin Turks have an entrepreneurial tradition. Open the stockade and Turks will become serious employers of Germans, easing unemployment. In the restaurant and other service businesses, this is already happening.

In 1965, Max Frisch, the Swiss playwright, said: ‘We called for workers and human beings arrived. They are not eating up our prosperity, on the contrary they are an essential part of it.’

The integration of ethnic minorities, of human beings, remains a central task, a touchstone of whether our two societies, British and German, are truly open or strait-jacketed by prejudice. In a border-free European Union, it seems to us that some of the invisible inner-city borders should also be tugged down. ‘Is it easier to be a Turk in Berlin, or a Pakistani in Bradford?’ Ask us again in a decade.